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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
hat explains why international and regional organizations in some cases choose to 
cooperate during peacekeeping operations, while in other cases find themselves 
competing for resources and control? This thesis seeks to explain variation in coordination, 
competition, and cooperation between international and regional organizations in the area 
of peacekeeping. In the post-Cold War era, a number of factors—including the 
proliferation of increasingly capable organizational actors, expansion of mandated tasks, 
and increasing complexity of conflict—have led to the development of an international 
peacekeeping “regime complex.” This complex is characterized by multiple international 
institutions that exhibit overlapping membership, are actively involved in matters of peace 
and security, and are connected by normative and operative interaction, both official and 
ad hoc. In some cases, this complex functions smoothly, while in others, it does not. By 
examining materialist, dependency, and identity factors at work in the peacekeeping regime 
complex, this thesis explores institutional interaction and the drivers of both rivalry and 
collaboration in the context of four cases: Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sudan, Mali, 
and Somalia. I hypothesize that organizations will cooperate when they hold 
complementary understandings of their roles within the peacekeeping regime complex, but 
will compete when these identities clash and overlap. Understanding these dynamics will 
not only lead to recommendations for more effective and efficient peacekeeping operations, 
but also contribute more generally to the growing theoretical field of regime complexity in 
international relations. 
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Introduction 
 
 
y 2007, an influx of refugees and foreign fighters from Sudan and the Central 
African Republic had plunged the country of Chad into a state of crisis. Attacks by 
armed groups threatened to completely destabilize Central Africa, endangering the lives of 
countless civilians and the activities of humanitarian organizations.1 Following months of 
bilateral and multilateral talks between the governments of Sudan, Chad, and the Central 
African Republic, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) adopted Resolution 1778, 
which established the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad 
(MINURCAT). Mandated to secure and protect civilians, as well as to promote human 
rights and the rule of law, MINURCAT in many ways closely resembled previous United 
Nations (UN) peace operations. 2  Yet, Resolution 1778 also called for several key 
divergences. Most notably, it called for close collaboration with the African Union (AU) 
and the European Union (EU), recognizing the former’s peace operation in Darfur and the 
establishment of a short-term, bridging military force by the latter.3 As a result, an intricate 
web of interorganizational cooperation emerged, with each institution contributing to the 
restoration of stability and the protection of civilians. Ultimately, such cooperation between 
organizations is important because, behind each mission, there is a more important issue: 
the lives of countless innocent civilians are at risk, and the stakes are high.  
                                                 
1 UN 2016, MINURCAT Background.  
2 UNSC 2007, Resolution 1778. 
3 Ibid.  
B 
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The founding documents of the AU, the EU, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO), and the UN all explicitly affirm these organizations’ commitment to the 
preservation of international peace and security. Further, increasingly dense relationships 
between international and regional organizations have developed, the product of 
formalized agreements and informal interaction. Yet, in execution, competition still exists 
on the ground, leading to a contradiction between what organizations state and what they 
practice.  
The purpose of this thesis is to understand why these organizations choose to 
cooperate, compete, or coordinate during contemporary international peacekeeping 
missions. I draw upon original interview evidence from the organizations, field work in 
Kenya, archival materials, and other sources to explore four in-depth case studies—the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Sudan, Mali, and Somalia—through the lens of 
three analytical frameworks: materialism, organizational dependency theory, and 
explanations of organizational identity. Each framework generates differing predictions for 
the cause of interorganizational cooperation and competition—some of which complement 
each other and others that do not—and each will be put up to the respective evidence and 
facts of each case. The ultimate goal is to draw out generalizable trends, patterns, and 
implications from this analysis, eventually establishing a more consistent and cohesive 
account of interorganizational dynamics. 
In brief, this project argues that, while materialist and organizational dependency 
arguments provide a partial understanding of interorganizational cooperation and 
competition during peace operations, they face challenges of intellectual consistency and 
3 
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do relatively little to explain the emergence of such coordinative structures. Instead, the 
account must be expanded to include explanations of how organizations’ respective roles 
and identities influence their decisions to pursue or not pursue cooperation with other 
international and regional institutions. Recognizing how organizations hold understandings 
of themselves and others leads to a more comprehensive and fundamental grasp of why 
and how they choose to act toward each other during peace operations, and perhaps more 
broadly within the international system. Further, accounting for these constructed identities 
allows for more efficient and effective policymaking, as it takes into consideration what 
organizations are willing and expected to do and contribute, thereby facilitating 
coordination of roles as opposed to competition.  
 
Significance of the Research Question 
This question is important for empirical, theoretical, and policy reasons. First, 
conflict in the contemporary, post-Cold War international system is increasingly 
characterized by intractable intrastate hostilities (see Figure 1).  These are precisely the 
types of situations that UN peacekeeping has been developed to address over the past 25 
years. Since 1948, 71 missions have been established, and 16 are currently in operation.4  
                                                 
4 Peacekeeping Fact Sheet. 
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Figure 1: Trends in Conflict (Source: UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset) 
This proliferation of internal conflict has occurred simultaneously with the 
proliferation of increasingly capable regional actors, namely the AU, the EU, and NATO. 
In recent years, these regional organizations have developed increased monitoring, policing, 
and observation capacities, while also contributing funding, troops, supplies, and training 
support. As a result, peacekeeping missions in the past decade have witnessed growing 
participation of regional actors; more recently, the EU’s participation in Mali, the AU’s 
participation in Sudan, and NATO’s participation in Afghanistan illustrate this trend. 
Yet, while these organizations share a commitment to the promotion of peace and 
security, the UN Charter is vague in addressing this issue of regionalization in practice. 
Articles 52-54 of the Charter outline a clear system in which regional organizations will 
cooperate with, yet remain subservient to, the UNSC in matters of peace and security. The 
reality has been far more complicated. Although most regional missions officially fall 
under UN auspices, answers to questions about which organization will actually bear the 
5 
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burden of organizing, supplying, funding, and executing missions have been ambiguous. 
When institutions overlap in goals and responsibilities but lack a clear framework to 
designate and delegate operational tasks, ad hoc arrangements emerge. In the case of peace 
and security issues, these ad hoc arrangements have been prevalent as multilateral actors 
have improvised and negotiated their relations and tasks with one another on the ground. 
In the absence of defined, hierarchical structures to guide their activities and interactions, 
some of these cases have been met with success, while others have not. Explaining this 
variation in institutional interplay during peacekeeping operations is therefore important in 
understanding the dynamics of contemporary peacekeeping.  
Second, answers to this question about institutional interaction in peacekeeping will 
contribute to the growing theoretical field of regime complexity in international relations. 
Much of the research on organizations and their behavior has focused on dynamics within 
organizations, but far less has focused on dynamics between them. The study of regime 
complexity addresses precisely this issue. Gehring and Faude define regime complexes as 
“functionally overlapping international institutions that continuously affect each other’s 
operations.”5 In general, regime complexes are not established purposefully by a structured, 
organizational apparatus, but rather gradually and spontaneously through interaction of 
their elemental institutions, with formalized mechanisms and arrangements emerging 
later.6 By these terms, international peacekeeping certainly constitutes a regime complex. 
Although it started solely with the UN, the peacekeeping regime complex has expanded in 
                                                 
5 Gehring and Faude 2013, 120.  
6 Ibid., 120-1. 
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scope and complexity in recent years due to the proliferation and development of regional 
organizations. Yet, the current literature has said little about what causes organizations to 
act, collaborate, and take on responsibility as a complex. This thesis will help to bolster the 
theoretical literature on regime complexes and institutional overlap, using multiple case 
studies to lead to generalizable conclusions about how and why regime complexes act 
successfully in some cases but not in others. More broadly, it can also provide a lens 
through which to view other problems of collective action within the international system, 
such as environmental protection and global terrorism. 
Lastly, on a practical level, understanding why and how cooperation occurs during 
peacekeeping missions can lead to more informed policy decisions that incentivize and 
promote coordination, thereby avoiding competition. Formulating international policy is 
particularly difficult when one considers the dizzying array of factors that influence how 
countless state and nonstate actors interact in the global arena. As a result, ambiguous 
policy is often implemented without a clear idea of what exactly it targets and what its 
consequences will ultimately be. By analyzing the successes and failures of peace 
operations, it is easier to document and repeat best practices. Further, this project can 
contribute to more precise definitions of what exactly interorganizational coordination 
means, isolating various types such as bureaucratic and operational cooperation.  
 
Classifications and Definitions 
 Before beginning, it is important to note and define several key concepts to ensure 
analytical clarity and consistency. The first task is to classify institutional cooperation and 
7 
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competition for the purposes of this thesis. In general, it is useful to start by drawing a 
distinction between bureaucratic and operational interorganizational cooperation. 
Regarding the former, organizations have increasingly developed agreements, frameworks, 
and memorandums of understanding that broadly outline shared commitments, goals, and 
strategies. Some documents address specifically and tangibly how organizations will 
coordinate their efforts in pursuit of a mutual objective, while others are more rhetorical in 
nature. This thesis, however, will focus on operational coordination, which encompasses 
how organizations actually cooperate and compete when developing and executing peace 
operations. In essence, it asks less about why organizations choose to deploy in the first 
place or why they have developed broad relationships, and more about why these 
organizations choose to interact with others on the ground. 
By this logic, and assuming that multiple organizations are deployed within the 
same country, organizational cooperation in this project will refer to scenarios in which 
organizational actors coordinate to share the financial, political, and operational burdens 
of peace operations. Examples of such cooperation include joint financing systems, the 
exchange of materiel and personnel, coordinated operational structures, and shared 
strategic objectives. Organizational competition occurs when organizational actors choose 
instead to compete for resources, political influence, and operational control. It should also 
be noted, however, that organizational noncooperation is also a common occurrence. It 
can be defined as a situation in which an organization is unwilling or unable to cooperate 
with another organization, but does not actively attempt to compete for resources or 
command. Measuring cooperative dynamics requires observing the existence of various 
8 
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mechanisms—both formal and ad hoc—that lead to joint planning, resource sharing, and 
other tangible indications of a coordinated relationship. The nonexistence of these 
mechanisms can either suggest competition or noncooperation. Competition can be 
measured by active attempts to control these processes, while noncooperation can be 
determined when organizations do not contend with each other over these factors, as well 
as when their actions do not heavily influence each other’s decisions.  
Cooperation and competition, however, can come in different forms. More 
specifically, within the literature of peace operations, Bah and Jones have identified three 
primary types of interorganizational cooperation: sequential, parallel, and integrated 
operations.7 Each framework also predicts points of competition, which will be discussed 
following a brief summary of each. The table below illustrates these frameworks: 
FRAMEWORK COOPERATION COMPETITION 
Sequential Operations One organization deploys a 
stabilization mission, followed 
by another deploying a long-
term mission 
Leads to disputes over re-
hatting, control of resources, 
timing, and authority 
Parallel Operations Multiple organizations deploy 
and operate autonomously 
within the same country, but 
toward broad, shared goals 
Disputes over strategic vision 
of operations and overlap of 
responsibilities can occur 
Integrated Operations Multiple organizations share 
operational control, or one 
organization subordinates 
command to another 
Organizations struggle over 
command and control over 
personnel, materiel, and 
capacities 
Figure 2: Frameworks of Cooperation and Competition 
                                                 
7 See Bah and Jones 2008.  
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Sequential operations occur when one organization deploys an initial mission with 
the intent of stabilizing the volatile situation on the ground, followed by another 
organization taking on a more long-term mission in the country. In most cases, the first 
mission is often a military operation, while the second usually focuses more on political 
and civilian components. While forces may be re-hatted from one organization to another, 
the missions themselves are most often independent and autonomously operated. Further, 
these transitions can occur as a regional organization’s mission being handed over to the 
UN, or vice versa. As Bah and Jones note, “Most of these sequential operations have been 
from a regional or multi-national organization to the UN. However, we are now witnessing 
another generation of sequencing…The handover from NATO to the EU in Bosnia…, and 
in Burundi the handover from the UN to an AU Special Task Force, marks a new 
phenomenon of regional organizations mounting longer-term stabilization missions in the 
wake of robust international peacekeeping.”8  Although sequential operations represent 
deliberate, coordinated transitions between organizations, they more often than not display 
operational noncooperation at the ground level.  
During parallel operations, multiple organizations “operate in the same theatre, 
under different command, but to the same broad goals.”9 Examples of parallel operations 
include Liberia, in which the UN and the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS) conducted simultaneous operations, and Bosnia, in which the UN and NATO 
both deployed during the Bosnian War. There are three variants underneath the heading of 
                                                 
8 Bah and Jones 2008, 2.  
9 Ibid., 2.  
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parallel operations. The first occurs when one organization provides short-term military 
support to another. In the second variant, “one organization provides the military backbone 
of the operation with a second undertaking military observation.”10 The third variant is 
characterized by one organization taking on military operations, with the UN providing a 
political framework, legitimacy, and both “political and civilian support to the national 
authorities.”11 Much like sequential operations, while organizations share strategic goals, 
parallel operations represent tactical and operational noncooperation.  
The final type are integrated operations, “missions in which two organizations 
share command or where one organization sub-ordinates [sic] its command to another.”12 
The most prominent example of this type is the United Nations-African Union Mission in 
Darfur (UNAMID), a joint peacekeeping mission in Sudan and a case which will be 
explored later in this thesis. Unlike sequential and parallel operations, integrated missions 
display both strategic and operational cooperation, sharing not only broad visions and goals, 
but also command and control over resources and personnel. Because of these complex 
and deep links, integrated operations are also the rarest form. Such intricate connections 
represent both opportunities and challenges for organizations. In the best case scenario, 
organizations can fully share and utilize each other’s resources and capacities in pursuit of 
a common objective. In the worst case scenario, however, these connections can lead to 
intense disputes over operational leadership.  
                                                 
10 Ibid., 3.   
11 Ibid., 3.  
12 Ibid., 3.  
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While Bah and Jones present sequential, parallel, and integrated operations as types 
of interorganizational cooperation, it is important to note that competition can also occur 
within each framework. For sequential operations, competition often emerges over the re-
hatting of troops and control of resources. It can also come about over questions of timing 
and authority. In Mali, for instance, the AU hoped to develop a follow-up mission after the 
ECOWAS deployed, but ultimately encountered disputes with the UN over materiel, 
personnel, and operational control, resulting instead in a UN mission. Parallel operations 
may encounter competition over these factors as well. Further, organizations within parallel 
operations may debate about the strategic vision of the missions or overlap in 
responsibilities. Lastly, competition occurs quite frequently during hybrid missions, as 
organizations struggle directly for operational command and control over personnel and 
materiel. The case of UNAMID has exhibited such competition.  
Ultimately, cooperation and competition can occur within each framework of peace 
operations. Further, as Brosig notes, “There is no causal chain between the increased will 
to cooperate and the actual mode of cooperation,”13 meaning that, in essence, the type of 
coordination demonstrated does not suffice to explain why organizations chose to pursue 
cooperation in the first place. This thesis will attempt to identify the causal factors that 
determine which will happen during a given case.  
It is also important to make a note about the analytical treatment of international 
organizations within this project. International organizations are complex institutions, 
made up of member states that often hold radically differing interests, resources, and 
                                                 
13 Brosig 2010, 335.  
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capabilities. Further, in many cases, membership in these organizations may overlap, 
sometimes rather significantly. For instance, the EU and NATO share 22 member states, 
and a state such as France holds prominent positions in both the EU and the UN, where it 
sits on the UNSC. As a result, it is exceptionally difficult to precisely pinpoint why and 
how organizations make decisions and act as they do. Scholars have taken several 
approaches to address these theoretical challenges. Some choose to treat international 
organizations merely as forums in which multiple states interact, while others—mainly 
realists—view these organizations as tools for the use of their most powerful states. For 
this project, however, I maintain that organizations should be viewed as independent actors 
with real, albeit sometimes limited, power to act within the international system. 
International organizations perform tasks that individual states are either unable or 
unwilling to do. As Brosig notes, “Indeed, if states could perform the tasks they have 
assigned to IOs [international organizations], the [sic] IOs would be more or less 
meaningless international actors. Thus most researchers acknowledge that IOs enjoy a 
degree of autonomy from their principals and can be studied as independent actors in 
international relations.”14 Further, for the specific purposes of this study, while individual 
states certainly have the ability to influence the outcomes of the organizational decision-
making process, these organizations ultimately act independently and autonomously on the 
ground during peace operations. 
 
                                                 
14 Brosig 2011, 148.  
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Argument 
The main argument of this thesis is based on conceptions of organizational identity, 
which has its roots in the international relations theory of constructivism. Constructivism 
is based on the logic of appropriateness, in which actors (including international 
organizations) choose among alternatives based on conceptions of appropriate actions 
derived from their identities and socially constructed obligations. In this sense, actions on 
the world stage are not automatically the result of a clear causal process based on tangible 
interests; rather, they are due to intersubjective understandings of what actors will and 
should do. These understandings emerge from internal social structures and roles, as well 
as from interactions within the international system.15  
More specifically, theories of organizational identity emphasize the importance of 
how international and regional organizations identify themselves and each other within the 
peacekeeping regime complex.16 As Legro notes, these organizational identities and roles 
are important because they shape organizational priorities, perception, and capabilities, 
thereby influencing how organizations choose to act toward each other, as well as factors 
such as resources.17 In practice, this means that organizations will cooperate when they 
hold and act upon complementary understandings of each other’s identities, visions, and 
capabilities. In this way, cooperation is tied less to tangible factors and more to 
interorganizational relationships and identities, which are based upon founding documents, 
communication, and repeated interaction. For instance, the UN views itself—based on its 
                                                 
15 See, for example, Hurd 2008. 
16 Tardy 2010, Building Partnerships in Peace Operations: The Limits of the Global/Regional Approach, 3. 
17 Legro 1996, 123.  
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charter—as having the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international security, 
while the AU maintains its prominence as a security actor on the African continent. These 
self-conceptions then have the potential to play out in tangible ways when the two 
organizations are co-deployed and negotiating terms of command and control. 
Explanations of organizational roles maintain that organizations will compete when 
they hold clashing or opposing understandings of each other. When international 
organizations harbor misperceptions about each other or challenge each other’s constructed 
roles within the peacekeeping regime complex, they threaten to impair coordinative 
relationships. Bureaucrats within their respective organizational hierarchies and 
commanders on the ground are especially concerned with such roles, and 
interorganizational interactions at the personal level are capable of affecting these 
dynamics. For instance, a number of senior EU bureaucrats who served as mid-level 
officials in the UN during the Bosnian War developed a strong distrust and lack of 
confidence in the UN, which they view as slow and inefficient.18 Such attitudes now, over 
two decades later, have affected the relationship between the two organizations. Further, 
institutions will compete when they struggle over relevance. For organizations operating 
within an anarchic international system—that is, a system with no overarching or 
established hierarchical order—there are no guarantees for funding or support.19 In order 
to survive as actors within the system, international organizations must continuously 
demonstrate their relevance to their member states and the states in which they operate. 
                                                 
18 Bellamy 2015, Interview. 
19 For an in-depth discussion on anarchy within the constructivist framework of international relations, see 
Wendt 1992.  
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Therefore, organizations may compete for visibility in the form of ownership and control 
during peace operations to prove their contributions to international security. 
 In brief, this thesis contends that understanding organizational identities are vital 
for understanding why organizations choose to cooperate and compete during peace 
operations. Shared conceptions of roles, priorities, and relevance help to explain and 
contextualize why cooperative and competitive relationships emerge between 
organizations on the ground, and how organizations act toward resources, capabilities, and 
each other. On the ground, this thesis argues that cooperation will occur between 
organizations when they share understandings of the complementary roles that 
organizations will and should play on the ground. Such shared understandings lead to 
clearer divisions of labor, resources, capacities, and control. Conversely, competition will 
occur when organizations hold contradicting and challenging conceptions of their roles 
both as institutions of peace and security and their roles on the ground. Competing 
identities and roles result in tangible competition over materiel, personnel, and operational 
command.  
 
Alternative Analytical Frameworks 
 This section introduces two other analytical frameworks, which draw upon 
literature and theories of regime complexity and organizational behavior within 
international relations. In the following chapters, these frameworks will also be applied to 
four in-depth case studies in order to test their intellectual accuracy, coherence, and 
consistency. The traditional literature on institutional interplay—both specifically focusing 
16 
TATE Q. KRASNER 
on peacekeeping and in general—provides differing explanations for organizational 
competition and cooperation. These arguments can be largely be divided into materialist 
arguments and theories of dependency based on comparative advantages. 
 
Materialist Explanations 
 Materialist explanations for institutional cooperation and competition are based 
primarily on resource factors, citing that coordination lessens the cost of action for all 
actors involved. Proponents of materialism argue that international organizations are 
rational actors whose preferences, interests, and doctrines guide decision-making. 
Cooperation, then, is most likely to appear when institutions can realize a certain benefit 
from exchanging resources.20 Tardy, for example, argues that institutions cooperate mainly 
because it reduces transaction costs by providing opportunities for information, expertise, 
financial, and materiel sharing.21 The sharing of troops and personnel also reduces the 
burdens of international and regional organizations, which often struggle to recruit 
peacekeepers from unwilling and unable member states. In this way, materialist 
explanations for institutional cooperation draw from neoliberal institutionalist theories of 
interstate cooperation in international relations. 22  From the materialist perspective, 
cooperation can reduce the heavy financial and resource burdens that peace operations (or 
other collective activities) often place upon overstretched and underfunded international 
organizations. 
                                                 
20 Brosig 2010, 328-31.  
21 Tardy 2010, Building Partnerships in Peace Operations: The Limits of the Global/Regional Approach, 2.  
22 See, for example, Keohane 1984.  
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 As for institutional competition, materialists point to the scarcity of resources in the 
international system as a point of interorganizational contention, often due to limited 
contributions from member states. In terms of peacekeeping, this scarcity is exacerbated 
by the overlapping membership discussed above, which forces states to choose how to 
contribute their resources. Therefore, within a given mission, organizations will often 
compete for access to vital resources, such as manpower, materiel, and financing. Further, 
because funding often comes with stipulations, international organizations may not pursue 
cooperation if they fear a loss of autonomy to, domination by, or subservience to another 
organization in terms of how to procure or utilize resources.23 
 One intellectual challenge of materialist explanations, though, is that they are not 
always causally consistent. In some cases, resource scarcity leads to cooperative sharing, 
while in others, it leads to competition and hoarding. For example, in Somalia, the EU, 
NATO, and the UN worked together to supply much-needed support—including technical 
assistance, funding, and materiel—to the AU-led peacekeeping mission, the African Union 
Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), which had struggled to acquire the necessities of the 
operation on its own. In many other cases, however, organizations have been unable to 
obtain contributions from other organizations, which are either unwilling or unable to 
provide their limited resources. While such cases do not completely invalidate materialist 
accounts of cooperation and competition, the causal duality of resource scarcity—which is 
a frequent factor in peace operations—leads to doubts that such arguments can account for 
variation across peacekeeping cases on their own. Nevertheless, given the prominence of 
                                                 
23 Brosig 2011, 156. 
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resource considerations within international relations theory, it is both important and 
valuable to apply these concepts to the evidence of the four cases. 
  
Organizational Dependency Explanations 
 Explanations of organizational dependency provide another set of hypotheses for 
institutional cooperation and competition. Within explanations of organizational theory, 
niche selection states that no two organizations will perform exactly the same tasks for a 
long period of time, as this would create unnecessary and counterproductive overlap and 
competition. 24  Drawing upon this concept, organizational dependency argues that 
cooperation will occur when one organization relies on another’s comparative advantages, 
which usually take the form of institutional capacities, mechanisms, or status. Essentially, 
cooperation emerges from a mutual reliance in order to work toward a shared objective, 
which is an underlying assumption of this framework.  
Within the context of peace operations, one example is the relationship between 
NATO and the UN. The UN is often dependent on NATO for operational capacities, while 
NATO might be dependent on the UN for political, civilian, and reconstruction 
capabilities.25 Another example is the interorganizational dynamic of the AU and the EU, 
in which the AU frequently relies on the EU’s logistical and training capacities (as the EU 
is made up of more technologically and politically advanced states), while the EU requires 
the regional legitimacy of the AU.  
                                                 
24 Gehring and Faude 2013, 123.   
25 Harsch and Varwick 2009, 31.  
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 Explanations of organizational dependency argue that competition will occur in 
scenarios where organizations vie for operational autonomy. International organizations—
like other actors within the international system—place a high value on autonomy, which 
allows them the agency and flexibility to make decisions and conduct themselves in world 
affairs. Without autonomy, the role and purpose of international organizations are 
diminished, which is a serious problem for institutions that are dependent upon the funding 
and support of member states. If member states do not view these organizations as 
important or valuable actors, the organization suffers directly. Therefore, organizations are 
hesitant to engage in cooperation with other organizations if it means a loss of autonomy.26 
In some cases, usually in which organizations are relatively self-sufficient, this hesitancy 
manifests in the form of noncooperation, but in others, it leads to intense competition over 
command and control. Cases of integrated operations, in which organizations rely on 
complex networks of capabilities, mechanisms, and communication, are especially prone 
to disputes over ownership and accountability.27 
 Like materialist explanations, organizational dependency theories also run into 
intellectual challenges. More specifically, they too suffer from dual causality. Reliance on 
capacities and mechanisms between organizations leads to structures of dependency, yet 
these structures lead to cooperation, noncooperation, and competition. Therefore, it is clear 
that an external factor must determine what accounts for this variance and which dynamic 
                                                 
26 Ibid., 29.  
27 Tardy 2014, 112. 
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will occur in a given case. Further, these arguments do little to explain why these dynamics 
emerge in the first place. 
 
Case Selection 
The case studies for this project have been selected from a specific set within the 
larger universe of cases of peace operations. The objective was to select and analyze 
missions involving significant institutional overlap, and the cases have been selected 
among operations since 2000, in which more than one international or regional 
organization has deployed or considered deploying a peacekeeping mission in a given 
country. The start date of the selection process has been set at 2000 because regional 
organizations—and, more specifically, the AU and the EU—only began developing their 
security and military capacities in the past two decades. 
 The first step of the process was to a compile a list of every peacekeeping operation 
undertaken by the AU, the EU, NATO, and the UN since the establishment of AU security 
capacities at the turn of the 21st century. The second step was to narrow this list to include 
only peacekeeping operations in which multiple organizations contributed directly to the 
establishment and execution of a given mission. A sample of this list is included below. 
Cases are included, to the extent possible, where there is a record of an institution actively 
considering a peacekeeping operation, even if it did not ultimately go forward.28 The more 
                                                 
28 Peacekeeping missions that are considered but do not go through—which may be due to institutional 
cooperation or competition, or other unrelated reasons—are not always publicly recorded. As a result, the 
records are lacking here. In essence, it is a quest for studying the dog that did not bark, which is difficult 
due to the lack of information available on what did not occur. The cases I have collected are as 
comprehensive as possible given practical constraints of time and public information. 
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difficult task was to determine whether each case of institutional overlap demonstrated 
cooperation, noncooperation, or competition. This task required an examination of each 
case to understand the specific type of dynamic between the organizations involved. These 
considerations will be discussed in detail in each case. 
ORGANIZATION ACRONYM LOCATION MISSION NAME 
UN MONUC DRC 
United Nations Organization Mission in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo 
EU Artemis DRC 
Military Operation in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo 
AU AMIS Sudan African Union Mission in Sudan 
EU  Sudan 
European Union Civilian-Military Action to 
Support AMIS 
NATO  Sudan NATO Assistance to AMIS 
UN UNMIS Sudan United Nations Mission in the Sudan 
AU/UN UNAMID Sudan 
African Union-United Nations Hybrid 
Operation in Darfur 
AU AMISOM Somalia African Union Mission in Somalia 
NATO  Somalia NATO Assistance to AMISOM 
EU 
EUTM 
Somalia 
Somalia 
European Union Training Mission in 
Somalia 
UN UNSOM Somalia 
United Nations Assistance Mission in 
Somalia 
ECOWAS AFISMA Mali 
African-led International Support Mission 
to Mali 
EU EUTM Mali Mali European Union Training Mission in Mali 
UN MINUSMA Mali 
United Nations Multidimensional Integrated 
Stabilization Mission in Mali 
Figure 3: Sample Case Selection Table 
The cases for this project have been selected in order to account for as much 
variation in outcomes as possible. In other words, while it remains difficult to classify 
22 
TATE Q. KRASNER 
interorganizational dynamics precisely, these cases demonstrate cooperation, 
noncooperation, and competition. It is also important to note that, within a given case, both 
cooperation and competition may have occurred, in some cases due to changing dynamics 
over time, and in others due to differing relationships between the multiple organizations 
involved (e.g. the AU and the UN did not cooperate, but the EU and the UN did).  
In order to more easily isolate causal factors, several other factors have been held 
constant. First, as briefly mentioned above, the time period has been held constant. By 
doing so, the project only includes cases in which organizational capacities—that is, the 
mechanisms, policies, and decision-making structures that allow them to deploy 
missions—are operational, stable, and thereby do not inherently prevent them from 
cooperating with other organizations on the ground.  
Second, the factor of participation has been held constant. While much of the 
research within the peacekeeping literature has focused on why organizations choose to 
deploy in the first place, this question of participation muddles and complicates the analysis 
of interorganizational cooperation and competition rather than simplifying it. Therefore, 
this project takes organizational participation as a given and does not attempt to explain in 
detail why an organization has chosen to deploy, instead focusing on why they choose to 
either coordinate their efforts or not once deployed.  
The first case, the DRC, was selected because it marked the beginning of military 
coordination between the EU and the UN, allowing for the examination of the origins of 
interorganizational cooperation. Further, the DRC is a useful example of parallel 
cooperation between organizations during peace operations, with the EU and the UN 
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sharing strategic goals but ultimately pursuing operational autonomy (and therefore 
noncooperation) on the ground. The second case is Sudan, which illustrates the 
development of the hybrid model of cooperation between the AU and the UN, but also 
examines the competition that have emerged in the execution of UNAMID. Third, the case 
of Mali has been selected because it has witnessed cooperation between the EU and the 
UN, but intense competition between the AU (and ECOWAS) and the UN. The fourth case 
is Somalia, which is somewhat of an extension case, as it has not included multiple military 
missions on the ground, but rather a single military operation (the AU’s AMISOM) 
supported financially, politically, and logistically by the EU, NATO, and the UN. The case 
of Somalia is important because it demonstrates that the analytical frameworks used in this 
project can be applied as a potential new mode of interorganizational cooperation, in which 
organizations take on specialized, compartmentalized roles on the ground. Overall, by 
exploring a high level of variation between cases, this project intends to draw out 
generalizable conclusions regarding interorganizational cooperation and competition. 
 
Evidence and Data 
 This project draws upon research composed of both primary and secondary sources. 
Academic journals, articles, and other related sources constituted the majority of the 
literature review, which focused both on theoretical works related to institutional 
cooperation and texts that track trends in peacekeeping. These secondary sources, paired 
with resolutions, proceedings, memorandums, and other documents from international 
organizations, also form much of the background information within the case studies.  
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However, primary sources set this project apart both in terms of depth and 
originality. First, a summer of field research conducted in Kenya out of the Hekima 
Institute of Peace Studies and International Relations—including interviews and visits with 
nongovernmental organizations and government officials working in areas such as security 
and refugee issues—provided a firsthand account of interorganizational cooperation.   
Second, this thesis utilizes interviews with officials and academics connected to the 
AU, the EU, and the UN. Conducted electronically and in person in locations such as 
Nairobi, Johannesburg, Paris, Abuja, and Brisbane, these interviews provided accounts of 
organizational actions by the policymakers themselves, who were able to pinpoint the 
precise and critical factors that influenced various institutional decisions. Further, by 
including prominent voices of African diplomats representing both states and the AU, 
interviews helped expand the information available from more traditional sources, such as 
Western think tanks, universities, and political institutions. In sum, these primary sources 
contribute to a much more comprehensive and accurate account of interorganizational 
dynamics.  
 
Chapter Overview 
 This thesis will proceed by first outlining important trends in the development and 
regionalization of peace operations that are key in aiding comprehension of the 
peacekeeping regime complex. It will next turn to the four cases, providing a brief 
background of each before analyzing them through the lenses of the theoretical frameworks. 
The cases will be discussed chronologically, with the exception of Somalia, which 
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represents a slightly differing model of interorganizational dynamics. The project will 
conclude by presenting findings, as well as discussing the academic and policy implications 
of this research. These conclusions will not only add to the current understanding of regime 
complexity within international relations, but also suggest several recommendations for 
developing more efficient and effective peace operations in the future. And ultimately, such 
improvements are vital because better missions translate to an increased ability to protect 
innocent civilians during crises.
CHAPTER II 
From San Francisco to Sudan: 
The Development and Regionalization of International 
Peacekeeping Operations 
  
 
n 1991, following a tumultuous decade of economic stagnation and political division, 
the state of Yugoslavia descended into chaos. Without the firm grip of the authoritarian 
leader Josip Broz Tito, who passed away in 1980, federal leadership deteriorated, relations 
among the six internal republics collapsed, and civil war broke out. The conflict was 
characterized by venomous nationalistic rhetoric, ethnic cleansing, and a multitude of war 
crimes. As reports began to emerge concerning crimes against humanity, the international 
community was faced with a decision of whether or not to act.1 Intense deliberation ensued, 
ranging from the financial and human costs of a potential operation to disputes over 
effectiveness. What emerged was UNSC Resolution 743, which established the United 
Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR). Utilizing the military capabilities of NATO, the 
most capable multilateral security organization at the time, UNPROFOR represented a 
significant advancement in interorganizational peacekeeping in the post-Cold War era, one 
of the earliest examples of substantial cooperation between an international and regional 
organization on the ground. What led to such cooperation? 
 This chapter seeks to contextualize the development and regionalization of 
peacekeeping operations, as well as explain several trends that are integral in understanding 
dynamics of cooperation and competition within the contemporary peacekeeping regime 
                                                 
1 Doyle and Sambanis 2008, 333.  
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complex. By tracing peacekeeping’s evolution within key time periods since World War 
II, it aims to answer several questions. First, how and why has peacekeeping developed as 
a conflict management tool? While Blue Helmets are now seen as a fixture of the United 
Nations and its peace efforts, this has not always been the case. Second, how have trends 
in conflict shaped the development of peacekeeping operations? Wars a half-century ago 
were primarily interstate, but modern warfare is defined by localized intrastate conflicts. 
And lastly, what factors have led to the regionalization of peacekeeping operations in the 
post-Cold War era? Contemporary peacekeeping operations have witnessed growing 
participation by increasingly capable regional organizations. Answering these questions 
will provide a thorough background for analyzing the four cases of this thesis.  
 In order to map out these trends chronologically and answer the questions above, 
this chapter will cover several time periods throughout the 20th century, charting major 
developments within each. The analysis begins in 1945 with the signing of the UN Charter 
in San Francisco and the origins of the Cold War. Next, it turns to the inception of 
peacekeeping and the deepening of global tensions during the 1950s. Following this decade, 
it explains the profound changes in conflict during the process of post-Colonialism and the 
further advancement of peacekeeping operations during the Cold War. The chapter then 
details the surge of missions following the end of the Cold War, finally concluding with 
the international community’s response to several failed peacekeeping operations. 
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1945-1948: The Birth of the UN System 
 In 1945, 50 countries descended upon San Francisco to take part in the United 
Nations Conference on International Organization. In response to the horrors of World War 
II, the participants intended to lay the framework for a new international order, one that 
would “save succeeding generations from the scourge of war.”2 For two months, the states 
debated over how best to construct a new global architecture that would reduce armed 
conflict, promote human rights, and facilitate social and economic progress. These 
proceedings were dominated by the victorious Allied Powers of World War II: China, 
France, the UK, the US, and the USSR. While they often held contesting views, these states 
were the most powerful actors in the international system at the time and thereby controlled 
the talks. Further, in order to get the five powers to all agree on the outcome of the 
conference, they were made permanent members of the organization’s Security Council. 
The result of the conference was the United Nations Charter, which—following ratification 
by the five permanent members of the UNSC—established the United Nations.3 
 Despite an atmosphere at the conference that was, overall, optimistically inclined 
toward globalism, the concept of regionalism also played a role in the proceedings. While 
the participating states sought to implement an international system to safeguard against 
future conflicts, they still desired an element of localized control to maintain autonomy. At 
that point, the concept of regional organizations was not yet a fixture within the global 
framework. Regional affairs were usually dominated by powerful states that sought to 
                                                 
2 UN Charter 1945, Preamble.  
3 UN 2015, San Francisco Conference. 
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implement their own agendas, not to cooperate with neighboring countries. In fact, only 
two “regional agencies”—the Pan-American Union and the League of Arab States—were 
even present in San Francisco at the time of the conference.4  
As Inis L. Claude notes, the “theoretical preference for universalism and the 
political pressure for regionalism…produced an ambiguous compromise” in the form of 
Chapter VIII of the UN Charter.5 While the participants intended to establish guidelines 
for “regional arrangements” through Chapter VIII, the section is rather vague regarding 
regionalism in practice. Articles 52-54 of the Charter outline a system in which regional 
organizations will cooperate with, yet remain subservient to, the UN Security Council, 
which holds primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. 
Because few regional organizations existed at the time, however, it was difficult to 
articulate precisely what this cooperation would look like and how institutionalized 
linkages would be formed between multiple organizations. Without formalized 
arrangements, relationships between international and regional were inevitably subjected 
to a long period of ad hoc trial and error. 
 Meanwhile, post-World War II optimism started to fade, leaving in its wake a 
geopolitical and ideological conflict between the US and the USSR—the Cold War. As the 
Iron Curtain fell, the two superpowers began to solidify, maintain, and expand their spheres 
of influence, seeking partnerships across the globe to advance their strategic interests. Soon, 
                                                 
4 Sidhu 2008, 218. 
5 Claude 1984, 114. 
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the international system had become a bipolar arena, leading the United Nations Security 
Council to nearly complete gridlock on matters of peace and security.  
 
1949-1963: The Origins of Peacekeeping 
 As the Cold War progressed, paralysis became a fixture of the Security Council. 
When North Korea invaded its southern neighbor in 1950, the USSR decided to abstain 
from a UNSC vote that sought to establish a military force to counter the attack. This 
inaction allowed the Western powers to dominate the decision-making agenda within the 
organization. As a result, the USSR turned to its veto powers to block its adversaries’ 
proposed resolutions from passing. Throughout the Cold War, both sides frequently 
utilized this strategy. 
The outbreak of the Korean War also marked the start of a new trend in international 
conflict: proxy wars. Without directly facing the other on the battlefield, proxy wars such 
as the Korean War allowed the two superpowers to advance their geostrategic ambitions 
by either directly or indirectly supporting foreign partners. In this manner, the Cold War 
manifested itself in small, confined, lethal conflicts, both interstate and intrastate, 
throughout the world, reaching Africa, Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America. This 
emergence of proxy wars also cemented the interests of great powers in regional affairs. 
With both the US and USSR interpreting minor localized hostilities as direct affronts to 
their fundamental ideological and political systems, they sought to play a more prominent 
and controlling role in regional issues. This pattern further solidified the superpowers’ 
notion that the great powers of the international system ought to hold primary responsibility 
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for regional matters of peace and security—with or without the UN—regardless of whether 
or not they had direct interests in a given conflict. 
 A rare moment of superpower cooperation occurred in 1956, however, when the 
US and USSR jointly responded to the Franco-British-Israeli intervention in the Sinai. The 
two states did not want to risk an escalation of hostilities, and both also had interests in 
maintaining positive relations with Egypt in order to counter each other’s influence in the 
Middle East. Seeking a peaceful resolution to the Suez Crisis before the conflict escalated, 
UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld and Canadian Minister of External Affairs 
Lester Pearson pushed for the development of the United Nations Emergency Force 
(UNEF). This mission was the first peacekeeping operation in UN history and initiated 
what is known in peacekeeping taxonomy as “first generation” peacekeeping, which entails 
the interposition of a neutral third-party force between warring factions after a truce has 
been reached.6 Designed to respond to interstate crises under Chapter VI of the Charter, 
the UN developed missions in which unarmed or lightly armed forces would be stationed 
to monitor truces, troop withdrawals, and buffer zones while political negotiations went 
forward. Further, Hammarskjöld and Pearson emphasized the defining characteristics of 
this generation of peacekeeping: consent, neutrality, impartiality, and use of fore only in 
self-defense.7 Only under these conditions could the UN operate as a fair and independent 
conflict management actor. 
                                                 
6 Doyle and Sambanis 2008, 324-5. 
7 Ibid., 325.  
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 First generation peacekeeping was designed to manage conflict in three ways. First, 
monitoring and transparency seek to raise the cost of defecting from an agreement by 
exposing the transgressing party publicly. Second, if this threat of exposure fails, the 
defecting party could face potential resistance from the peacekeeping force. Lastly, because 
of the UN’s international legitimacy, cooperation with the organization benefits each party 
through increased credibility. These operations tend to keep the peace most effectively 
under specific conditions, including well defined factions (most often state actors) and a 
clear ceasefire agreement.8 
 The threat of war during this time period also contributed in part to the creation of 
several regional organizations in order to provide collective security for their members in 
the event of conflict. The establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 
in 1949 and the Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation, and Mutual Assistance (the Warsaw 
Pact) in 19559 represented a significant step in the proliferation and utilization of regional 
security institutions. While both organizations remained dominated by their respective 
superpower backers and were often manipulated to serve narrow national interests—such 
as the Warsaw Pact’s aggressive response to the 1956 Hungarian Revolution 10  that 
maintained Soviet influence in the country—they solidified the concept of collective 
regional security and, later on, would serve as platforms for multilateral military operations.  
 At the same time, the formation of economic communities in Europe and Africa 
also helped lay the groundwork for regional cooperation outside of the military sphere. 
                                                 
8 Doyle and Sambanis 2008, 326. 
9 NATO 2015.  
10 Ibid. 
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Several prominent European countries, reeling from the absolute devastation of World War 
II, united to create the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1950 and the 
European Economic Community (EEC) in 1957.11 In a similar fashion, the uncertainty of 
post-Colonialism led to a desire for a more unified and autonomous African continent and, 
as a result, the Organization for African Unity was established in 1963.12 This proliferation 
of regional organizations allowed for the creation of political and economic linkages on a 
continental scale, linkages that would facilitate the formation of more advanced 
organizations in the following decades. Against the backdrop of the Cold War, which was 
dominated by the superpowers, such organizations also allowed regional players to have a 
greater voice in the international arena. 
 
1963-1991: The Cold War Continues 
 The remainder of the Cold War witnessed several important developments in 
peacekeeping, conflict, and regional organizations. Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu notes three 
significant trends particularly important to the discussion on the regionalization of 
peacekeeping. First, because the UNSC remained gridlocked, both the US and USSR 
regularly utilized regional organizations to advance their strategic interests under the 
pretext of multilateral legitimacy, often in the context of proxy wars. The US, for instance, 
frequently used the OAS to conduct operations against communist regimes and rebel 
groups in Latin America. These interventions, however, did not share the humanitarian 
                                                 
11 EU 2015, The History of the European Union.  
12 Hanson 2009. 
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characteristics of peacekeeping mission of the time. Further, this pattern of turning to 
regional groups instead of the UN had serious implications, as it “not only weakened the 
primacy of the UN over regional organizations, but also established a two-tier system of 
regional groups, which was precisely what the drafters of the Charter had tried so hard to 
avoid.”13 In essence, regional groups such as the OAS, NATO, and the Warsaw Pact had 
become extensions of their superpower backers, and their elevation damaged the UN’s 
effectiveness and credibility. 
 Second, the preference of superpowers to utilize regional organizations over the 
UN set a precedent for “regional groups to take action, including the use of force, often 
without the consent or even in opposition to Security Council mandates to ostensibly 
maintain peace and security.”14 This precedent inhibited the creation of a clear hierarchy 
and framework of cooperation between the UN and regional organizations, a problem that 
would plague peace operations in the post-Cold War era. And, while other countries—
including many in the General Assembly and the Non-Aligned Movement—opposed such 
blatant uses of force, these objections were ineffective in the face of the dominant 
superpowers.  
 Lastly, throughout the Cold War, several Western policymakers promoted the idea 
that regional organizations ought to serve as the UN’s military component for peace 
operations. The partiality of groups like the Warsaw Pact, however, rendered such an idea 
politically impossible.15 Or, for example, no state in the Soviet sphere of influence would 
                                                 
13 Sidhu 2008, 219. 
14 Ibid., 219. 
15 Ibid., 219-20. 
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ever consent to a peacekeeping mission within its borders spearheaded by a biased 
organization such as NATO. Lacking the capabilities of and partnerships with regional 
organizations, the UN was restricted to turning to its often unwilling member states for 
financial and military contributions, leaving the organization without its own security 
capacities.  
 In addition, the era of post-Colonialism that emerged over the course of this time 
period influenced new trends in conflict and posed new challenges to international peace 
and security. As a multitude of countries in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Middle 
East declared independence—cutting ties with their former European colonizers—political, 
social, and cultural fragmentation threatened to destabilize not only individual states, but 
also entire regions. While the emergence of new states threatened existing power dynamics, 
leading to several significant interstate conflicts, conflict during this time period primarily 
manifested itself in a new form of localized, intrastate civil wars. These conflicts were 
often characterized by political and ideological divides, divides that tended to induce 
superpower intervention and reinforced the system of proxy wars between the US and the 
USSR.  
Moreover, because regional organizations lacked the capabilities and autonomy to 
maintain peace and security within their respective domains, divided countries were forced 
to turn to either the great powers or UN mediation for assistance in security matters. 
However, despite the deployment of several large-scale peace operations during these 
decades, such as those in Congo, Cyprus, and the Middle East, peacekeeping remained 
underdeveloped and under-supported. Therefore, superpower interference—either by 
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direct intervention or indirect support through their respective proxy factions or regional 
organizations—remained the modus operandi. Nevertheless, as the rate of decolonization 
increased toward the end of the Cold War, “the recently decolonized countries, particularly 
from Asia and Africa, also emerged as the biggest troop-contributing countries to UN 
operations.”16 Peacekeeping contributions have allowed these countries to elevate their 
status in the international status and their troops to gain invaluable military experience and 
funding. 
 
1991-2000: The Post-Cold War Decade 
 The end of the Cold War marked a dramatic expansion in the number, scope, and 
complexity of peace operations. The fall of the Soviet Union freed the UNSC from almost 
half a century of paralysis, prompting a revitalization of international cooperation, 
particularly in the realm of peace and security.  
Despite an atmosphere of cooperation and optimism, however, the international 
community continued to face major security challenges. While the number of interstate 
conflicts declined significantly, a multitude of intrastate conflicts—mainly ethnically 
charged, postcolonial civil wars—permeated the international system, increasing the 
demand for peacekeeping operations. These simultaneous trends in cooperation and 
conflict are best reflected by a single statistic: between the years 1945 and 1987, 13 
                                                 
16 Sidhu 2008, 220. 
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peacekeeping missions were developed around the globe; the next four years alone 
witnessed 13 new missions.17 
 The development and regionalization of peacekeeping during this time period is 
best understood in the context of conflicts that emerged in the post-Cold War era. While 
peacekeeping had been designed initially to monitor and enforce treaties and ceasefires 
agreed upon by legitimate state actors, the increasingly complex hostilities that erupted in 
Africa, Latin America, Asia, and parts of Europe required a fundamentally new approach. 
These types of civil wars almost completely invalidated the applicability of First 
Generation peacekeeping, which proved ineffective in quelling intrastate conflicts that 
involved aggressive and uncooperative actors. This shift required an innovate 
reconceptualization of what peace operations could and should do. As a result, the “Second 
Generation” and “Third Generation” of peacekeeping emerged.  
Second Generation peacekeeping—as carried out in Namibia (UNTAG), El 
Salvador (ONUSAL), Cambodia (UNTAC), Mozambique (ONUMOZ), and Eastern 
Slavonia (UNTAES)—expanded the responsibilities of mission mandates, including 
demobilization, peacemaking, disarmament, civil authority supervision, human rights 
implementation, economic rehabilitation, and election organization.18 In essence, Second 
Generation missions not only attempt to create a negative peace that stops the shooting, but 
also a positive peace that helps develop post-conflict societies. 
                                                 
17 UN 1992, An Agenda for Peace. 
18 Doyle and Sambanis 2008, 327. 
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In contrast, Third Generation missions, such as the First Gulf War, more accurately 
fall under the category of peace enforcement, which entails the utilization of military force 
to impose a peace on unwilling warring factions. Third Generation peace enforcement is 
effectively war-making, ranging from low-level military operations to protect the delivery 
of humanitarian assistance to the enforcement of cease-fires and, when necessary, 
authoritative assistance in the rebuilding of so-called failed states. Drawing upon UN 
Charter Articles 25, 42, and 43, such missions are often called “Chapter VII” missions,19 
referring to UN guidelines on “action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the 
peace, and acts of aggression.”20 
It is important to note that the typology of peacekeeping “generations” has less to 
do with their chronology and more to do with mandate and scope. In fact, in the post-Cold 
War era, both organizations and state-led coalitions have utilized all three generations of 
peacekeeping, depending on the type of conflict on the ground. Yet, the explosion in the 
number of missions, coupled with the increased complexity of each operation, placed an 
incredible strain on the UN and the newly established Department of Peacekeeping 
Operations (DPKO), which was created in 1992. As a result, the UN began to increasingly 
turn toward regional organizations for assistance and operational support.  
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The Shift toward Regional Organizations 
Engagement with regional actors provided beneficial opportunities for the UN, 
which was now more willing to coordinate with regional organizations following the 
gridlock of the Cold War. The emerging intrastate conflicts within the international system 
were often localized, a factor that clearly lent itself toward regional solutions for several 
reasons. First, regional organizations more often share cultural values and historical 
experiences with member states within the region, providing both legitimacy and trust. 
Second, local states have a more vested interested in regional security, given that spillovers 
could lead to regional instability. Third, regional actors have a higher familiarity with 
context-specific factors, leading to a deeper understanding and awareness of conditions 
that could influence operations. Fourth, assuming the organization’s willingness to act, the 
proximity of regional organizations allows for faster mobilization, a critical factor in 
protecting civilian lives during missions. Lastly, given the factors above, regional 
organizations are better-suited for engaging in post-conflict peacebuilding, which is an 
essential aspect in developing positive and functional societies following civil wars.21 
In addition to these positive factors, however, the move toward regional 
organizations presented the UN with a number of challenges. First, the utilization of 
regional organizations allows the developed world to pass off regional problems to 
institutions that are often underequipped, underfunded, and under-supported. Second, a 
system of regional security has the potential to lead to differentiated peacekeeping capacity 
between underfunded UN peacekeepers and well-funded regional peacekeepers, leading to 
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severe discrepancies in terms of financing, equipment, command structures, and other 
factors.22 
These considerations, both positive and negative, forced the UN to articulate a more 
developed position on its relationships with regional organizations, one that went beyond 
the ambiguous guidelines of Chapter VIII. In particular, the UN Secretary-General Boutros 
Boutros-Ghali’s 1992 document, An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, 
Peacemaking, and Peace-Keeping, aimed to strengthen and focus UN peacekeeping. This 
document attempted to capitalize on the optimism of the period and the apparent emergence 
of a new era of international cooperation, while recognizing that the increasing number of 
peacekeeping missions was placing a strain on the organization’s capacity and resources. 
Boutros-Ghali identified three key principles for UN-regional relationships. First, An 
Agenda for Peace reemphasized the primacy of the UNSC regarding matters of peace and 
security. Second, it stated that, although the capacities of regional organizations varied 
widely, they should be viewed as equals by the UN. Lastly, in an effort to retain responsive 
flexibility and avoid locking regional organizations into a structured security system, the 
document decided against establishing formal patterns of relationships or specific divisions 
of labor.23 While An Agenda for Peace was not a binding legal document, it clarified the 
position of the UN regarding regional organizations in an era of change and uncertainty, 
essentially relegating interorganizational coordination to ad hoc relationships, even in 
times of crisis.  
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Immediately following the publication of An Agenda for Peace, however, three 
events challenged Boutros-Ghali’s principles. In 1993, a failed US operation in support of 
the United Nations Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II) all but doomed the international 
organization’s humanitarian intervention in the country. The Battle of Mogadishu resulted 
in a number of US casualties, leading UNOSOM’s most prominent supporter to withdraw 
from the mission. The following year witnessed the horrific Rwandan genocide, which left 
hundreds of thousands dead in the central African state in the course of mere months. The 
international community was virtually unresponsive in the face of the genocide, save for a 
drastically underfunded and ineffectual UN mission, the United Nations Assistance 
Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR). At the same time, civil war continued to ravage the 
Balkans with no clear end in sight. Loose cooperation between the UN and NATO 
gradually stemmed military offensives in the region, but episodes such as the massacre at 
Srebrenica highlighted the inadequacies and inefficiencies of the international 
community’s response.  Combined, these events proved that the conflicts of the post-Cold 
War era presented the UN and regional organizations with incredibly complex challenges 
that required innovative, localized solutions. 
In response to these failures, Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali issued a supplement 
to An Agenda for Peace in 1995. In a much more sober tone than the optimistic 1992 
document, the supplement recognized “that these new intrastate conflicts presented the 
United Nations with challenges that it had not faced since the Congo operation in the early 
1960s,”24 when the organization deployed a massive, complex, and multifaceted mission. 
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With this recognition came the understanding that, in order to swiftly and efficiently 
respond to crises, regional organizations needed to play a larger and more structured role 
in the realm of peace and security. Therefore, most importantly, the supplement called for 
a clear division of labor in order to avoid overlap and institutional rivalry.25 Despite this 
revision, however, little was done in the following years to practically establish cooperation 
between the UN and regional actors.26 This lack of cooperation manifested itself in a 
disjointed response to the outbreak of war in Kosovo in 1998, in which NATO conducted 
unilateral operations without UN approval, despite the UN’s “grave concern” over the 
situation. 27  Political rivalries again stalled the UNSC, as Russia opposed the NATO 
operation so close to its borders.  
 The decade following the end of the Cold War also witnessed the formation and 
evolution of several regional organizations. In 1993, the Maastricht Treaty officially 
created the European Union, further institutionalizing continental integration.28  It also 
developed an institutionalized foreign and security policy for the organization. While the 
EU established numerous political and economic mechanisms, the organization itself 
lacked independent and functioning security capacity during this time period. A lack of 
both capacity and willingness was particularly evident when the EU failed to take action 
to protect the lives of innocent civilians in Bosnia. 
NATO remained the most capable organization militarily; yet, the end of the Cold 
War posed an existential debate about the relevance of these types of security organizations. 
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What role, if any, did an organization that was created for collective security against an 
opposing superpower have now that that superpower no longer existed? While some 
predicted the disbandment of NATO following the dissolution of the USSR, the 
organization instead expanded its functions, turning to regional security in addition to 
collective defense.29 NATO served as an effective platform for contributing to multilateral 
operations, and regional security allowed the organization to assert its relevance following 
the collapse of the Soviet Union. 
Meanwhile, in Africa, the OAU struggled to develop a coherent security strategy 
to respond to the conflicts that continued to rage across the continent. Many members of 
the OAU were weak, postcolonial states that were struggling to respond to their own 
internal problems, let alone regional or continental security issues. The Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS), a subregional organization, however, did 
play a minor role in several operations during the time period. In fact, UN-ECOWAS co-
deployment in 1993 as part of the UN Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) represented 
the first official experiment in joint peace operations. Later in the decade, UN-ECOWAS 
collaboration continued when, in 1998, the UN deployed the UN Observer Force in Sierra 
Leone (UNOMSIL) alongside the Economic Community of West African States 
Monitoring Group (ECOMOG). As Gelot, Gelot, and de Coning note, “These West African 
examples, and what was learned from these experiments and developments…helped to 
situate the current debate about improving support models for African peace operations.”30 
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 In short, peace operations experienced radical transformation in the decade 
following the end of the Cold War. A global spirit of optimism and cooperation faded 
quickly in the face of tumultuous, protracted, and horrific intrastate conflict. Nowhere was 
this shift more apparent than in the realm of peacekeeping, where a series of extreme 
failures prompted an aversion to further operations and a strong distrust on the part of states 
and regional organizations in the ability of the UN to adequately, rapidly, and efficiently 
respond to crises. Nevertheless, the emergence of new models of peacekeeping and several 
examples of successful cooperation laid the groundwork for a new era of peace operations. 
 
The 2000s: Calls for Reform 
 The failure of the UN to protect innocent civilians during the previous decade—
particularly in Rwanda and Bosnia and Herzegovina—prompted calls for drastic 
peacekeeping reform in the early 2000s. These calls came both from states that contributed 
to operations, which were apprehensive of the missions’ efficiency and costs, and from 
states in which the operations occurred, which held concerns regarding the gross 
inadequacies of the operations.  
The international response came in three forms. The first type was top-down, 
institutional reform by the UN, which intended to renovate its dysfunctional peace 
operations system. The second type came in the form of newly-established and transformed 
regional organizations, which sought enhanced independent security capacities. The third 
type manifested itself in both institutionalized and ad hoc cooperation between 
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organizations during peace operations. Together, these responses have laid the framework 
for the contemporary peacekeeping regime complex.  
One of the most significant measures taken came in 2000, when UN Secretary-
General Kofi Annan—in response to these failures—created the Panel on United Nations 
Peace Operations to analyze inadequacies within the international peacekeeping system 
and to develop solutions to these shortcomings. The Panel’s resulting report, commonly 
known as the “Brahimi Report,” established a vision to guide future peace operations, 
specifically calling “for renewed political commitment on the part of Member States, 
significant institutional change, and increased financial support.”31  
Another important aspect of the Brahimi Report was its renewed call for 
strengthened relationships with regional and subregional organizations during peace 
operations, based on Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. While reaffirming the primacy of the 
UNSC within matters of peace and security, the report stated: “Providing training, 
equipment, logistical support and other resources to regional and subregional organizations 
could enable peacekeepers from all regions to participate in a United Nations peacekeeping 
operation or to set up a regional peacekeeping operations on the basis of a Security Council 
Resolution.” 32  Regarding such cooperation, however, it warned that “caution seems 
appropriate, because military resources and capability are unevenly distributed…and 
troops in the most crisis-prone areas are often less prepared for the demands of modern 
peacekeeping than is the case elsewhere.”33 Despite these recommendations, though, the 
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Brahimi Report encountered the same fundamental challenge of An Agenda for Peace from 
the past decade, namely that it did little to establish tangible and practical mechanisms to 
guide interorganizational cooperation during peace operations.34 It also failed to address 
the underlying problem of the lack of political will among states to collaboratively fund 
and execute peacekeeping missions. 
 The failed peace operations of the immediate post-Cold War era also heavily 
influenced the creation and development of regional organizations in the early 2000s. This 
influence came primarily in two forms. First, regional organizations were forced to 
recognize their own security shortcomings in dealing with local crises. The OAU simply 
did not have the capacity to respond to outbreaks of hostilities in locations such as Rwanda 
and Somalia, and the EU watched helplessly as the Bosnian War raged in its own backyard. 
As for NATO—despite advanced military capabilities—it came to the realization during 
its operations in Kosovo and at the start of the War in Afghanistan that it lacked a 
comprehensive strategic approach that included crucial civilian functions, such as elections 
monitoring and political development.35 Second, a strong skepticism of the UN developed 
among regional organizations. “In Africa, a history of instability and disappointing 
international response to conflict and crisis, notably the genocide in Rwanda,” led the OAU 
to doubt the credibility and ability of the UN to step in and stabilize hostilities on the 
continent.36 Within the ranks of NATO and the EU, many who served formerly as mid-
level staff of the UN during the war in Bosnia developed skepticism toward the efficiency 
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and reliability of the organization’s peace operations. 37  This combination of internal 
inadequacies and external skepticism drove substantial development of regional 
organizations during this time period. 
 The most visible regional response to these challenges was the disbandment of the 
OAU and establishment of the African Union (AU) in 2002. Prompted by Libyan leader 
Muammar al-Gaddafi, the AU was developed in part to more effectively and independently 
address emerging and ongoing conflicts throughout the continent. Many proponents of the 
OAU had been strong, authoritative regimes that sought to retain power within their 
respective countries without fear of external interference. One of the most fundamental 
differences between the OAU and the AU was that, while the former was founded on the 
principles of state sovereignty and noninterference, the latter was formed with the primary 
goal of protecting the continent. 38  In fact, “The AU is the world’s only regional or 
international organization that explicitly recognizes the right to intervene in a member state 
on humanitarian and human rights ground.” 39  Despite significant organizational and 
financial barriers, the AU immediately became involved in peacekeeping, deploying its 
first mission to Burundi in 2003. Both the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) 
and its most visible component, the Peace and Security Council (PSC), have established 
protocol for decision-making related to the prevention, management, and resolution of 
conflicts.40 Not only have such mechanisms institutionalized the security framework of the 
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AU itself, but they have also laid the basis for security-related engagement with other 
international and regional organizations.  
 In response to the crisis in the Balkans, the EU set out to develop its own 
independent security capacity. While many members of the EU also hold membership 
within NATO, relying on NATO for security assistance also meant relying primarily on 
the United States for security assistance. Therefore, following NATO’s intervention in 
Kosovo in 1999, the European Council stated that “the Union must have the capacity for 
autonomous action, backed by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, 
and the readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises without prejudice to 
actions by NATO.” 41  Prominent members of the EU pushed for this self-reliance, 
especially France, which saw the EU as an opportunity to take an organizational leadership 
role, as it remained behind the US and the UK in both the UN and NATO. A number of 
agreements that same year helped to advance the organization’s ability to jointly and 
effectively respond to crises both in Europe and abroad. Along with the creation of the 
Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), The Treaty of Amsterdam allowed the EU 
to speak collectively on foreign policy matters and solidified conditions under which 
military units could be deployed, while the Cologne European Council reaffirmed the EU’s 
commitment to developing independent, credible military capabilities.42 
 Lastly, while the operations of the 1990s reaffirmed NATO’s place as the most 
militarily capable and robust international organization, experiences in the Balkans and 
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Afghanistan further propelled its post-Cold War transformation from solely focused on 
collective defense to expanding its civilian and political functions. After relying heavily on 
other organizations—particularly the UN—for civilian capacities in Bosnia, Kosovo, and 
Afghanistan, NATO’s members have increasingly called on the organization to develop a 
comprehensive capacity.43 Achieving such capacity would allow NATO almost complete 
self-sufficiency in conducting multifaceted peace operations.  
 The third major response to the peacekeeping failures of the 1990s was the 
development of new forms of both institutionalized and ad hoc cooperation between 
international and regional organizations. Recognizing the strategic, financial, and 
operational limitations of approaching peace operations independently, these organizations 
sought methods to improve efficiency and reduce their burden during missions. 
Institutionalized cooperation came mainly in the form of bilateral agreements between 
organizations, many of which built upon existing ad hoc coordination on the ground.  
The first of these formalized arrangements, the EU-NATO Berlin Plus Agreement 
and the Joint Declaration on UN-EU Co-operation in Crisis Management, were introduced 
in 2003. The Berlin Plus Agreement created a framework that allowed the EU to utilize 
NATO military capacities during EU-led crisis management operations. These 
developments at the turn of the 21st century allowed the EU to deploy its first peace 
operation, Operation Concordia in Macedonia, in 2003.44 The Joint Declaration intended 
to solidify the cooperation that occurred between the UN and the EU in Bosnia and 
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Herzegovina and the DRC, where the EU assisted in security transitions.45 Reaffirming EU 
subservience to the UNSC in matters of peace and security, the two organizations agreed 
to “enhance mutual coordination and compatibility” in the areas of planning, training, 
communication, and best practices.46 This document facilitated joint operations in Darfur, 
Afghanistan, and Georgia, leading to another Joint Declaration in 2007 that reiterated these 
principles and advocated for increased dialogue and additional mechanisms to enhance 
coordination.47  Additionally, as mentioned above, the Berlin Plus Agreement laid the 
groundwork for EU-led security operations and improved the working partnership between 
the EU and NATO, promoting “effective consultation, cooperation and transparency in 
crisis management and peace-building operations.”48 The Berlin Plus framework allowed 
for a different type of interorganizational coordination in the Balkans, where the EU 
spearheaded the operation while NATO was utilized for its military assets and 
capabilities.49 Both the 2003 Joint Declaration and the Berlin Plus Agreement formalized 
institutional cooperation, albeit in different ways. While the former was a result of existing 
cooperation on the ground, the latter initiated interorganizational coordination.  
As the AU began to operationalize its security mechanisms and participate in 
peacekeeping missions, it also sought to formalize its relationships with other international 
organizations. Because the AU is a young organization, “it is not surprising that its 
respective relationships with the other three organizations are as yet relatively rudimentary 
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and informal.”50 In 2003, in response to the outbreak of civil war, the AU deployed its first 
peacekeeping mission in Burundi, coordinating with the EU and the UN. Both 
organizations realized that a strong and competent regional security actor in Africa capable 
of preventing and responding to conflict would reduce their own burdens on the continent. 
The EU provided funding and technical support to the mission, marking the start of EU-
AU cooperation in the field.51 Working with the UN, official authority was transferred from 
the African Union Mission in Burundi (AMIB) to the United Nations Operation in Burundi 
(ONUB) in 2004, an example of sequential cooperation, in which one organization hands 
over operations to another following an initial period of stabilization.52  
This cooperation, along with further coordination as the AU deployed in Sudan, 
laid the foundation for strategic agreements between the AU, the EU, and the UN. In 2005, 
following a series of talks between the EU and African states, the EU officially declared 
its willingness to “work with the AU, sub-regional organizations and African countries to 
predict, prevent and mediate conflict, including by addressing its root causes, and to keep 
the peace on their own continent.”53 The following year, the Lisbon Summit resulted in a 
joint EU-Africa strategy, under which the EU pledged increased support and finance for 
AU security mechanisms and capacity.54  In 2006, the UN released a declaration entitled 
“Enhancing UN-AU Cooperation,” which established a ten-year capacity-building 
framework for the AU, intended to promote consultation and collaboration on matters of 
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peace and security.55 Following further cooperation on the ground in countries such as 
Sudan and Somalia, the two organizations released a report in 2012 that called for greater 
joint political and strategic coherence. In particular, the report recognized the successes of 
the UN-AU partnership, identified the need for clearer divisions of labor, and stressed that 
regional organizations should be flexible and adaptive. Further, it emphasized African 
ownership of peace operations on the continent.56 Although these arrangements represent 
commitments to interorganizational cooperation, such institutional rhetoric has not always 
been consistently backed by action. That being said, recent years have witnessed increased, 
albeit still ad hoc, coordination between the three organizations on the ground. In contrast 
to progress made with the EU and UN, AU-NATO cooperation remains relatively 
undeveloped. While “NATO has, upon the AU’s request, contributed logistical and 
technical support to the AU missions in the Sudan and Somalia,” the two organizations 
have not adopted formalized collaboration agreements.57 
Following over a decade of reform efforts, the UN released a document entitled 
“New Horizon” in 2009, an agenda that provided “wide-ranging and significant 
recommendations to bolster the effectiveness of peacekeeping and reinforce partnerships” 
among stakeholders.58  Emphasizing the necessity of continued bilateral, regional, and 
multilateral security relationships with partnering institutions, New Horizon recommended 
a new framework to improve interoperability, focusing on resource-sharing, information-
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sharing, and mission transitions.59 New Horizon, however, did not lead to the development 
of substantial interorganizational mechanisms to solve the problems that the document’s 
recommendations sought to address. Further, as with the Brahimi Report, New Horizon did 
little to address the lack of political will among the international community to mobilize in 
support of peace operations. 
Ultimately, as the cases of the DRC, Sudan, Somalia, and Mali will illustrate later, 
the international responses to the peacekeeping failures of the 1990s over the past 15 years 
have produced ambiguous results. Despite a plethora of agreements, arrangements, and 
declarations, interorganizational cooperation during peace operations remains 
fundamentally ad hoc. Unsurprisingly, given political and financial considerations, no 
framework has been developed that systematically and automatically induces institutional 
cooperation from the start of a mission, and coordination is thereby formulated on a case-
by-case basis, either on the ground or through the operation’s individual mandate. States 
are simply unwilling to lose their control over political autonomy and resources, a problem 
that has plagued multilateral peace operations since their inception. On October 31, 2014, 
Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon established an independent panel to assess the current 
state of UN peace operations and provide recommendations for the future.60 Despite this 
panel’s focus on issues such as the changing nature of conflict and regional partnerships, 
however, it is unlikely that any recommendations will lead to tangible and permanent 
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mechanisms between international and regional organizations to promote cooperation on 
the ground.  
 
Conclusion 
International peace operations have come a long way since their development in 
the 1950s. The number, scope, and complexity of missions have expanded exponentially, 
and today’s operations encompass a vast constellation of responsibilities, requiring 
intricate and wide-ranging mandates. These developments have been facilitated by 
increased involvement on the part of increasingly-capable regional actors, which are likely 
to play an important role in future missions. 
Despite the evolution of peacekeeping operations since UNEF in the Sinai, one 
factor that has remained constant within the peacekeeping regime complex throughout its 
history is its ad hoc nature. Formalized mechanisms are not in place to dictate if, when, and 
how organizations should participate in peace operations. As a result, unpredictability and 
uncertainty relating to financing and operational command and control structure, among 
other concerns, continue to permeate the development of new missions. Building off the 
foundations and contextualization of this chapter, the following chapters seek to explore 
what drives interorganizational cooperation on the ground during peacekeeping operations 
in the absence of a clear, structured, and hierarchical framework.
CHAPTER III 
A Call for Help: 
Cooperation and Noncooperation in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo 
 
 
he horrors of the 1994 Rwandan Civil War completely shocked the Great Lakes 
Region of Africa, which was no stranger to violent conflict. In addition to the 
hundreds of thousands who perished during the appalling genocide, thousands more 
Rwandans fled into the surrounding region as refugees, creating tensions that led to 
hostilities in other countries, including the DRC. Moreover, the conflict sent a strong signal 
to the international community—and especially the UN—that their conflict management 
mechanisms were inadequate. While the UN originally developed peacekeeping as a tool 
to assist in the implementation of established ceasefires, bureaucrats and officers alike 
quickly realized during early missions that their resources and mandates were strikingly 
inadequate in addressing conditions on the ground, which were often far more complex 
and hostile than expected. As a result, missions—both past and present—have the tendency 
to become overextended quickly. 
 The UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) fell victim 
to precisely this type of overstretch in the early 2000s. Shortly following their deployment, 
UN peacekeepers experienced a resurgence of conflict on the ground, rendering their 
presence inadequate and ineffective.1 Simply put, they lacked sufficient troops, equipment, 
and capacity to confront the increased volatility and ethnic violence that was occurring. 
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Unlike past missions that experienced overstretch, however, the UN was not alone this time 
as the sole organizational keeper of the peace; the development of increasingly capable 
regional organizations meant that the UN could turn to institutional partners for help. Upon 
the request of UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan in 2003, the EU developed its first rapid 
military deployment outside of Europe in support of the UN, Operation Artemis, breaking 
new grounds for UN-EU cooperation.2 The case of the DRC is particularly interesting for 
two reasons. First, because it marked the first instance of substantial military cooperation 
between the UN and the EU (albeit more strategic in nature than operational), it can show 
how interorganizational dynamics initially emerge. Second, it witnessed both organizations 
operating within clear and defined roles on the ground, despite almost no history of an 
interorganizational security partnership. This chapter seeks to explain what conditions and 
motivations led to this unprecedented coordination between the UN’s MONUC and the 
EU’s Operation Artemis. In the process, it will also add to our understanding about how 
interorganizational structures of cooperation emerge.  
 This chapter will begin by exploring the history of conflict and peacekeeping in the 
DRC, as well a number of the operations that have taken place in the country over the past 
decade. Next, it will briefly outline the classification of institutional coordination that 
occurred. It will then test the analytical frameworks in light of the existing evidence, 
examining which ones hold up best in explaining cooperation and noncooperation between 
the UN and the EU. The chapter will conclude by drawing out generalizable conclusions 
regarding interorganizational coordination from the case of the DRC. Ultimately, it argues 
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that, whereas materialist and organizational dependency arguments fall short accounting 
for the cooperative structure between the two organizations, explanations of organizational 
identity deepen the account and illuminate the emergence of the interorganizational 
relationship. 
 
Background 
 The UN and the DRC share a long history, dating back to the deployment of the 
United Nations Organization in the Congo (ONUC)—one of the most extensive and robust 
peacekeeping operations in history—in response to the “Congo Crisis” during the early 
1960s. For the purposes of this case, however, the story begins in 1994 with the end of the 
Rwandan Genocide. Following the mass atrocity, a new government formed in Kigali, 
leading over a million Rwandese Hutus—a number of which had taken part in the 
genocide—to flee to the neighboring Kivu regions in eastern DRC, formerly known as 
Zaïre.3 This migration caused tensions in the area, which was inhabited by ethnic Tutsis 
and others. In 1996, hostilities erupted when Laurent Désiré Kabila led Tutsi forces from 
southern Kivu in a rebellion against President Mobutu Sese Seko and the army. With the 
support of Rwanda and Uganda, Kabila’s forces took the capital city of Kinshasa in 1997 
and renamed the country the DRC. Kabila’s success, however, was short-lived. In 1998, 
another rebellion—the Congolese Rally for Democracy—began in the Kivu regions, 
seizing large areas of the country. Despite support from Angola, Chad, Namibia, and 
                                                 
3 United Nations 2015, MONUC Background.  
58 
TATE Q. KRASNER 
Zimbabwe, the rebels retained control of the eastern regions with the support of Rwanda 
and Uganda. The UNSC called for a ceasefire later that year and for foreign forces to 
withdraw from the DRC’s internal affairs. These calls eventually resulted in the signing of 
the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement in July 1999 by the DRC, Angola, Namibia, Rwanda, 
Uganda, and Zimbabwe.4 
 Shortly after the signing of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, the UNSC established 
MONUC under Resolution 1279 in November 1999. Initially, MONUC was mandated to 
observe the ceasefire and disengagement of forces and maintain liaison with all parties of 
the agreement, but because the UN was the most capable actor on the ground, later 
resolutions expanded its mandate to include the supervision of the agreement’s 
implementation, as well as other tasks.5 MONUC began with an initial deployment of 
liaison officers in 1999, intending to keep communications open with the warring factions 
and preparing for the deployment of military observers, who began arriving in 2000. 
Amidst ongoing hostilities, MONUC began fulfilling its tasks with gradually expanding 
forces in 2001 and 2002, as it oversaw the disengagement process, monitored human rights 
violations, and facilitated humanitarian assistance. 6  While instability inhibited the 
peacekeeping process, MONUC—focused on its primary task—was successful in 
facilitating the withdrawal of foreign troops under the terms of the Lusaka Ceasefire 
Agreement.  
                                                 
4 Ibid. 
5 Ibid.  
6 Dundon 2012, Table of Multilateral Peace Operations, 90.  
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 MONUC’s success in assisting the withdrawal, however, resulted in unintended 
and deadly consequences. The Lusaka Agreement stipulated that the UN would use 
persuasive or coercive peace enforcement measures if warring parties refused to depart, so 
in late 2002 and early 2003, Rwanda and Uganda—both of which had supported rebels in 
the DRC’s eastern regions—withdrew tens of thousands of their soldiers from the country. 
The ensuing power vacuum led to a resurgence of ethnic violence and the deterioration of 
the security situation in the northeastern Ituri region. MONUC, which had been founded 
upon a ceasefire agreement and a presumption of relative stability, suddenly found itself 
overextended and facing open conflict in the DRC. With the ethnic violence beginning to 
resemble the outbreak of genocide in Rwanda, numerous ambassadors to the UN called for 
the strengthening of MONUC. In an effort to assist the mission, UN Secretary-General 
Kofi Annan issued a request to create and deploy a separate temporary multinational force 
to Ituri.7 
 The EU answered the UN’s call with the establishment of a military operation in 
the DRC, codenamed Artemis.8 France, given its history as the colonial power in the 
country and its longstanding interest in the region, was seen as a natural leader for the 
mission, and many countries—including the United States—pushed for France to 
spearhead the EU operation. Operating under the authorization of UNSC Resolution 1484 
and Council Decision 2003/432/CFSP, as well as Chapter VII of the UN Charter, 9 
Operation Artemis deployed in June 2003 to stabilize the Ituri region.10 By design, both 
                                                 
7 Novosseloff 2012, 12.  
8 European Union External Action 2015, Artemis DRC Mission Description. 
9 Dwan and Wiharta 2004, 150.  
10 Council of the European Union 2003, Council Decision 2003/432/CFSP. 
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the UN and EU intended Operation Artemis to serve as a short-term holding mechanism 
“until a sufficiently mandated and equipped UN operation could be deployed.”11 
Operation Artemis was the EU’s first military force to deploy outside of Europe. 
While it was designed to support operations in the DRC, it retained a high degree of 
autonomy from the UN, MONUC, and the DPKO. First, as the leader of the mission, 
France directed the organization and execution of Operation Artemis from headquarters in 
Paris. Second, unlike the EU’s mission Concordia in the former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia earlier in 2003, Operation Artemis did not rely on NATO assets under the 
Berlin Plus Agreement.12 Lastly, the EU strictly adhered to a tight timeframe of 100 days 
for its operation.13  
Operation Artemis was successful in fulfilling Resolution 1484’s requests that it 
“contribute to the stabilization of the security conditions and the improvement of the 
humanitarian situation in Bunia” and “contribute to the safety of the civilian population, 
UN personnel and the humanitarian presence in the town.”14 Its successful fulfillment of 
its mandate can be attributed to several key factors. First, the mission adhered to a mandate 
with clear, achievable goals and well-defined roles.15 Second, the mission operated under 
a strict timeline, which ensured that the EU would not become bogged down or 
overextended. Lastly, while Operation Artemis was technically an EU mission, the fact 
that France spearheaded the operation meant that Artemis enjoyed the strategic, financial, 
                                                 
11 Dwan and Wiharta 2004, 150.  
12 Dunay and Lachowski 2004, 48-9. 
13 Tardy 2015, Interview.  
14 UNSC 2003, Resolution 1484.  
15 Haugevik 2007, 17-8.  
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and political backing of a great power in the international system. Unlike other peace 
operations, which often require clunky interdependence between states that contribute 
troops and states that contribute money, Operation Artemis troop was both funded and 
executed by France, thereby streamlining operations and reducing the mission’s external 
reliance.  
Precisely on schedule, Operation Artemis officially ended in September of 2003.16 
Upon Artemis’s completion, the UNSC strengthened MONUC’s mandate in order to take 
over the EU’s operation. Its troop strength was increased to nearly 10,500, with almost 
5,000 earmarked for the Ituri region.17 The UN was able to execute the transition, although 
it was unable to rehat EU peacekeepers as UN peacekeepers due to the reluctance of EU 
member states.18  
 EU-UN cooperation in the DRC occupies an important spot in the history of 
interorganizational security cooperation. Operation Artemis represented one of the earliest 
examples of planned military coordination between the two organizations and laid the 
groundwork for future collaboration, such as peace operations in Chad and the Central 
African Republic several years later. Yet, scholars have questioned the viability of 
attempting to duplicate such an operation. As Richard Gowan notes, “The desire to repeat 
this success led European planners to take a narrow view of what future operations would 
be like…If inter-organizational cooperation involves learning through repeated 
interactions, it can stifle innovation because it frequently seems easiest to redo what has 
                                                 
16 European Union External Action 2015, Artemis DRC Mission Description. 
17 UN 2003, Fourteenth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, UN Document S/2003/1098.  
18 Tardy 2015, Interview.  
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done before without variations.”19 This analysis raises the question of what facilitated the 
cooperative relationship between the EU and the UN. The remainder of this chapter seeks 
to answer this question. In doing so, it will examine the factors that influenced and created 
interorganizational cooperation between UN’s MONUC and the EU’s Operation Artemis, 
exploring the evidence through the respective lenses of the analytical frameworks and 
showing the important role of organizational identity in determining relationships between 
the two institutions.  
 
Classification of Coordination  
Before utilizing the analytical frameworks themselves, it is necessary to identify 
the type of coordination that occurred between the UN and the EU in the DRC in order to 
ensure evaluative consistency. The UN’s MONUC and the EU’s Operation Artemis were 
an example of parallel peace operations, in which “the UN and other entities operate in the 
same theatre, under different command, but to the same broad goals.”20 MONUC and 
Artemis also represented a specific variant of parallel operations, as Artemis provided 
short-term military support to the UN. This variation contrasts with other parallel 
operations, in which “one organization provides the military backbone of the operation 
with a second undertaking military observation.”21 As with the majority of parallel peace 
operations, the UN provided both a political framework for the military operation and the 
                                                 
19 Gowan 2009, 56. 
20 Bah and Jones 2008, 2.  
21 Ibid., 3. 
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core of civilian support to authorities in the DRC.22 This classification allows for key 
distinctions to be made regarding cooperation in this particular case. On a broad level, the 
EU and the UN displayed cooperation by sharing a common goal (i.e. stabilization in the 
Ituri region) and in the sense that Artemis filled a particular void within MONUC’s 
strategic structure, that is, advanced and robust military capacity.  
However, integrated cooperation did not occur on the ground. The missions in the 
DRC exhibited high degrees of organizational autonomy, operating under separate 
mandates and command structures, and each organization maintained control over its 
respective resources. Therefore, when discussing cooperation in the DRC, we are 
discussing functional—as opposed to operational—cooperation. In other words, Artemis 
played a cooperative role within MONUC’s overarching framework, but it ultimately 
remained autonomous and self-sufficient on the ground.  
 
Materialist Explanations and Evidence 
 Materialist explanations maintain that organizations will cooperate when their 
resources can be pooled to achieve shared goals but will compete over control of scarce 
resources and financing. This contradiction, noted in the introductory chapter, leads to 
analytical ambiguity. The evidence in the DRC suggests that, while material concerns 
stimulated cooperation between the UN and the EU at the strategic level, they also 
contributed to operational noncooperation on the ground. 
                                                 
22 Ibid., 3. 
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 At the strategic level, material factors facilitated cooperation between the two 
organizations. Sharing the UN’s goal of securing the Itrui region, the EU answered the 
UN’s plea for increased resources and troop presence.23 Well-funded and made up of 
wealthy Western states, the EU did not struggle with the problem of resource scarcity to 
the same degree as other regional organizations, such as the AU. The EU faced little 
challenge financing a limited support mission, with France driving the effort. France, a P5 
member of the UNSC with interests in the region as a former colonial power, had both the 
capabilities and willingness to contribute a considerable amount of resources to Operation 
Artemis. Further, while MONUC encountered a shortage of troops and materiel at the time, 
this temporary instance should not overshadow the fact that the UN remained, for the most 
part, a well-funded and well-resourced itself, mostly the result of financing from the United 
States, which was the mission’s largest contributor. Therefore, at the broader level, the 
DRC overall cannot be viewed as a case of resource scarcity, which is the most essential 
factor for material competition. The evidence shows that the UN’s request for the Ituri 
region was limited and relatively trivial for a well-financed organization like the EU, which 
shared the UN’s goals in the DRC. These factors contributed to strategic cooperation and 
minimized contention over resources between the two organizations.  
 On the ground, however, material considerations led to noncooperation between 
the EU and the UN. Both organizations maintained complete control over their respective 
resources and troops, with the exception of low-cost transactions, such as information 
                                                 
23 Tardy 2015, Interview.  
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sharing and political communication.24 As Artemis’s primary financier and contributor, 
France had a strong interest in ensuring that the EU retained command of Artemis’s assets 
and supplies. In fact, “if one examines force structure, command structure and financing, 
the EU’s Operation Artemis looks more like a French-led MNF…than it does an operation 
composed of and commanded by a multilateral organization.”25 The mission was “mounted 
and run from Paris headquarters,” rather than UN headquarters in New York or even EU 
headquarters in Brussels.26 Further, following Artemis’s 100 day deployment, the UN 
failed to keep EU peacekeepers as rehatted UN peacekeepers, instead turning to 
Bangladesh to provide troops to secure the EU’s work in Ituri.27 EU member states strongly 
resisted becoming entangled in the operations of the UN, which they viewed as inefficient 
and cumbersome. Thus, the EU displayed hesitancy in ceding control of its resources to 
the UN. On the other hand, the EU did not make use of UN resources at the operational 
level for two reasons. The UN had little to offer Operation Artemis, which was well-funded 
and self-sufficient, and MONUC was not mandated to combine resources with the EU 
mission. Taken together, these factors led to noncooperation on the ground. 
Materialist arguments, however, unsatisfactorily explain strategic cooperation and 
operational noncooperation in this case. Here, the problem of dual causality emerges. On 
the one hand, materialist arguments suggest that a relative abundance of resources 
facilitated strategic cooperation between the EU and the UN, or at least minimized 
competition. On the other hand, though, they suggest that the two organizations chose not 
                                                 
24 Tardy 2015, Interview. 
25 Jones and Cherif 2004, 16.  
26 Dwan and Wiharta 2004, 156. 
27 Tardy 2015, Interview.  
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to cooperate on the ground due to concerns over resource sharing. Thus, materialist 
explanations may contribute to our understanding of cooperation and noncooperation 
between the EU and the UN, but this question demonstrates that they do not ultimately 
offer a full causal account.  
 
Organizational Dependency Explanations and Evidence 
 Dependency explanations contend that, while organizations prefer to operate 
autonomously, which can lead to noncooperation or competition, they will rely on each 
other’s comparative advantages in order to cooperatively achieve shared goals. In the case 
of the DRC, both the EU and the UN demonstrated reliance on each other’s capabilities in 
order to stabilize the Ituri region. This dependence, however, falls short in fully explaining 
cooperation and noncooperation in the country. 
 Both UNSC 1484 and Council Decision 2003/432/CFSP recognized that MONUC 
faced a substantial security shortcoming in the Ituri region that required the assistance of 
an external multilateral force. Both the UN and the EU possessed unique advantages to 
contribute to the mission. On the one hand, the UN contributed legitimacy and a political 
framework to peace operations in the DRC, providing credibility to Operation Artemis, 
which operated under UNSC approval. On the other hand, the EU provided “robust military 
capacity in support of the UN.”28 Further, a clear division of labor facilitated cooperation 
between the two organizations and prevented overlap.29 However, that Artemis’s mandate 
                                                 
28 Tardy 2014, 100.  
29 Tardy 2015, Interview. 
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only lasted for 100 days meant that the EU was not providing as much support as it 
potentially could have in the DRC. Instead of putting its advanced security capacity to use 
to meet other demands that MONUC faced, the EU ultimately decided against taking on a 
larger role, which will be discussed in more detail in the following section. These facts 
suggest that the EU was not cooperating in response to the UN’s shortcomings, but rather 
for other reasons beyond dependency. 
As predicted by organizational dependency theory, this division of labor led to 
noncooperation, not coordination, on the ground. Because it was backed by France—which 
boasts one of the most powerful and well-equipped militaries in Europe—Operation 
Artemis was almost completely self-sufficient once it was deployed in the DRC. Further, 
EU member states feared becoming bogged down if they assisted MONUC directly. 
Without major reliance on the UN’s capacities, the EU chose to operate autonomously in 
the DRC. The UN, which had little to offer to Operation Artemis in terms of capacity, had 
extremely limited say in the framework that emerged. As Tardy notes, “It is the EU rather 
than the UN that sets the agenda and defines the terms of the UN-EU relationship, which 
is characterised between what the UN wants and what the EU is willing to offer.”30 
 While a relationship of dependency existed in the DRC between the UN and the 
EU, it was not, once again, a mutual relationship. Instead, it was a highly unequal dynamic 
in which the UN heavily relied upon the EU’s comparative advantage of robust military 
capability, but the EU relied little on the UN’s contributions. As a multilateral regional 
organization made up of strong and wealthy states, the EU already possessed both the 
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legitimacy and capacity to execute a peace operation in the DRC. Therefore, dependency 
arguments provide neither a satisfactory nor complete explanation as to why the two 
organizations ultimately decided to cooperate with each other. More specifically, the UN’s 
uneven dependency upon the EU is not enough to explain why the EU chose to assist 
MONUC in Ituri, considering the UN could do little to benefit the EU.  
 
Organizational Identity Explanations and Evidence 
Explanations of organizational identity provide a more fundamental understanding 
of interorganizational dynamics in this case than the two previous theoretical frameworks. 
Organizational identity explanations hold that organizations construct and adhere to 
intersubjective roles that influence their actions on the world stage. Both the UN and the 
EU developed unique roles in the process of peace operations in the DRC, roles that lent 
themselves both to cooperation and noncooperation. Through Operation Artemis, the EU 
deliberately developed its role as a supportive—yet ultimately limited—security actor, 
while the UN maintained its role as the most prominent organizational actor in the area of 
peacekeeping.  
 The strategic level witnessed the EU and the UN adopting cooperative roles in the 
DRC. In the early 2000s, the EU was developing mechanisms to promote itself as an 
effective security actor and regional partner independent of NATO, an aspiration “clearly 
articulated in the European Security and Defence Policy.”31 Such separation was a long-
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held goal of France, who spearheaded both Operation Artemis and the move away from 
NATO in general. Cooperation in the DRC was an opportunity for the EU to demonstrate 
its “capacity to respond quickly to a UN appeal for help in a crisis situation.”32 This 
deliberately constructed role was also represented by the EU’s decision to forgo NATO 
assistance under the Berlin Plus Agreement and instead rely on its own planning and 
command capabilities.33 For the UN, this cooperative approach was simply a continuation 
of its efforts to engage with regional security organizations in the post-Cold War era. The 
UN sought to augment its security capacities with those of regional organizations, and 
Operation Artemis provided them such an opportunity in the DRC. The UN did wish, 
however, to retain its status as the overarching actor in the country, and Artemis’s status as 
a short-term stabilizing mission to be taken over by the UN at the end of 2003 reinforced 
the UN’s predominant control of peace operations in the DRC. These complementary roles 
facilitated cooperation at the strategic level. 
 Organizational roles can also help explain why the EU chose not to cooperate with 
the UN on the ground during the deployment of MONUC and Operation Artemis. While 
the EU wished to be viewed as an effective and supportive security actor, it also sought to 
maintain its operational autonomy. The EU’s conception of itself as a security actor 
revolves around the concept of autonomy. “Autonomy of action and decision is 
consubstantial to CFSP [Common Foreign and Security Policy] and the aspiration to be a 
global player.”34 In general, this role now often manifests at the operational level, reflected 
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by “the necessity to have any EU-led operation put under the political control and strategic 
direction of the Political and Security Committee. This explains the impossibility for an 
EU military operation to be placed under UN command.”35 It also was strongly held by 
member states and manifested in the DRC. As Tardy notes, “the possibility to deploy EU 
operations as an alternative to a direct contribution to the existing UN Organization 
Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) was welcomed by European 
states. Such an option was even what made their involvement politically and technically 
acceptable.”36  
Additionally, interviews with high-ranking EU officials, many of whom had 
worked within the UN during failed operations in Bosnia and Rwanda, reveal that they 
displayed a strong distrust in the efforts and effectiveness of the UN as a security 
organization.37 Such distrust reinforced the EU’s conception of itself as an autonomous 
actor and increased its desire to operate independent of the UN, as opposed to as an 
extension MONUC’s operations on the ground. This desire for autonomy was also reflected 
in the limited scope and time span of the mission, testifying to “EU member states’ 
continued hesitancy about risky out-of-area peace operations.”38 Moreover, the EU not 
only hoped to avoid the financial and political drain of operational overstretch, but also 
realized that Operation Artemis—as its first significant and independent military 
operation—had the potential to shape the EU’s broader role in the international security 
arena. The EU had the material capabilities to contribute to MONUC in a far greater role 
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than Operation Artemis, which operated for only 100 days in a small geographic area of 
the country. By imposing strict timelines on Artemis, the EU calculatingly and deliberately 
established itself as a supporting peace and security actor, allowing it to sparingly choose 
its commitments.  
 In essence, the EU conscientiously used Operation Artemis to develop its more 
prominent role as an independent actor in the international peace and security arena. While 
such prominence may appear as foreign policy activism, it may not actually produce much 
change on the ground, as evidenced by the EU’s efforts “to prioritize the production of 
highly visible peacekeeping outputs rather than the provision of less visible but arguably 
more effective contributions to UN peacekeeping.”39 In essence, at the strategic level, the 
EU attempted to develop itself as a cooperative actor, but its noncooperation at the ground 
level also revealed its desire for operational autonomy. 
 
Conclusion 
 A confluence of factors ultimately influenced both strategic cooperation and 
operational noncooperation between the UN and the EU in the case of the DRC, yet 
explanations of organizational identity provide the most fundamental and comprehensive 
causal account of the dynamics between the two organizations. At the strategic level, 
materialist and dependency explanations can aide understanding of cooperation between 
MONUC and Operation Artemis, but they fall short of providing a complete causal account 
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of why the EU chose to cooperate with the UN, with the latter having little to offer the 
former. Both organizations shared the strategic objective of stability in the DRC, and 
particularly in the Ituri region. By providing material resources and its military capabilities, 
the EU could bolster MONUC—which benefited from a strong political framework and 
high political credibility—through Operation Artemis and help achieve this goal. However, 
mutual interest does not necessarily entail mutual dependency, and what emerged in the 
DRC was a lopsided relationship of material and organizational dependency. The UN, 
desperate for troops and materiel in the Ituri region, was at the will of the well-financed 
and capable EU. Therefore, materialist and dependency explanations paint a clear picture 
of why the UN expressed a desire to cooperate with the EU, but not vice versa, as they do 
not provide for the incentives of the EU to work with the UN. It is here that organizational 
identity arguments can contribute to the explanation of strategic cooperation. Incentivized 
by its desire to become a prominent, independent security actor, the EU came to the aid of 
the UN with Operation Artemis, proving itself as supportive and cooperative. In short, 
organizational identity explanations provide the one piece of missing information that the 
other frameworks do not: the EU’s motive for cooperating in the first place. Taken with 
the arguments of the other frameworks, it is clear that the strategic relationship between 
the UN and the EU was borne out of the former’s need for capacity and resources and the 
latter’s intent on building an image as a relevant and effective regional organization. 
 At the operational level, organizational identity explanations also provide a more 
in-depth understanding of noncooperation than materialist and dependency arguments. 
Once deployed, Operation Artemis was almost completely self-sufficient, and the EU had 
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little reliance on the UN’s finances or capabilities beyond the political framework that the 
UN had already put in place in the DRC. This self-sufficiency, based primarily on France’s 
economic and military support of the mission, allowed the EU complete control over its 
troops and resources and to operate autonomously on the ground. As the materialist and 
dependency arguments would suggest, the EU—without any major shortcomings or 
dependence upon the UN—chose to work independent of the UN. The organizational 
identity theory, however, expands on this explanation, taking into account a more 
calculated move on the part of the EU. It maintains that the EU, which contained numerous 
top officials who distrusted the UN, sought to deliberately establish itself as an independent 
security actor capable of performing supportive niche roles in peace operations. In short, 
the EU did not merely seek to become a prominent security actor; rather, it sought to 
transform itself into a very specific type of security support role that would maximize 
visibility and autonomy while limiting its commitments. 
 The case of the DRC is significant not only because it helps illuminate the dynamics 
of interorganizational cooperation and competition, but more importantly, because it helps 
us understand how such dynamics emerge in the first place. Ultimately, any account of 
institutional coordination must address the origin of these relationships in order to remain 
intellectually coherent. Interorganizational relationships regarding peace operations do not 
simply exist—they are created from past experience and intersubjective understandings of 
each organization’s role and purpose within the peacekeeping regime complex. It is 
doubtful that these precise conditions could be repeated exactly, however, considering the 
specificity and limited nature of the UN’s request. Further, attempting to do so may “risk 
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compartmentalizing peacekeeping to packaged support which is not automatically based 
on needs on the ground,” but instead on expectations of what the organizations respectively 
can and should do.40 Nevertheless, The DRC case elucidates the creation of the EU-UN 
peacekeeping relationship, which is important in understanding both the later cases and 
contemporary peace operations as a whole.
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CHAPTER IV 
The Hybrid Model: 
Cooperation and Competition in Sudan 
 
 
he newly founded AU deployed its first mission to the tiny Great Lakes country of 
Burundi in 2003, a small peacekeeping force consisting of about 3,000 troops.1 The 
African Union Mission in Burundi (AMIB) was developed as a one-year stabilization 
operation, and upon its successful completion, it was transitioned into the United Nations 
Operation in Burundi (ONUB). The sequential cooperation model employed by the two 
organizations was widely heralded as a success, and many in the international community 
saw it as a potential mechanism to address civil wars on the African continent. So when 
the AU—still a young organization—decided to deploy to Sudan the following year, it 
sought to take the same approach. What unfolded in Sudan, however, was one of the biggest 
peacekeeping catastrophes and humanitarian nightmares of the post-Cold War era. The 
mission faced constant obstacles, including logistical, communications, financial, and 
operational challenges, and unlike AMIB, the AU had no clear exit strategy.2 
 After several years of operation, a new mode of interorganizational cooperation—
the hybrid model—emerged in Sudan in the form of the United Nations-African Union 
Mission in Darfur (UNAMID). UNAMID displayed a new method of integration between 
the AU and the UN, which ultimately led to ambivalent relations between the two. This 
chapter will examine the evolution of interorganizational coordination in Sudan in an 
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T 
76 
TATE Q. KRASNER 
attempt to determine the causal conditions of cooperation and competition during 
peacekeeping missions. Given the unprecedented transition to the hybrid model of 
peacekeeping on the ground, Sudan is a particularly interesting case that provides unique 
insight into the question of why international institutions choose to cooperate and compete. 
It is also important because it shows that integrated peace operations do not automatically 
result in effective interorganizational cooperation on the ground. 
 The chapter will proceed as follows. First, it will provide a brief background to the 
civil war in Sudan, which is integral in understanding the subsequent peacekeeping 
operations. Second, it will discuss the model of coordination that emerged in the country. 
Third, it will apply the evidence to the three analytical frameworks, determining which 
aligns with the realities of the case most accurately. Lastly, it will include a brief conclusion 
that offers inferences on organizational interplay beyond the case of Sudan. Ultimately, 
this chapter argues that, while materialist and dependency arguments encounter the 
problem of dual causality, explanations of organizational identity provide an account of 
how the AU’s and the UN’s conflicting identities resulted in competition, even within 
UNAMID’s cooperative framework.  
 
Background 
 The initial peacekeeping mission in Sudan, AMIS, was deployed in response to a 
humanitarian ceasefire that had been reached to put an end to the Darfur conflict in Sudan. 
In the early 2000s, local disputes in the western Sudanese region of Darfur—fueled by the 
breakdown of local governance and a frustrated provincial elite—rapidly escalated into 
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bloody conflict. The authoritative regime in Khartoum, which has been countering 
insurgencies since the 1980s, responded brutally and ruthlessly. Massacre, displacement, 
and famine resulted, leaving an estimated 200,000 dead. Further, distrust deepened 
significantly between Darfurians and the ruling regime in Khartoum, and Darfurian society 
itself fragmented as multiple local conflicts threatened anarchy in the struggling region.3 
 On April 8, 2004, under the auspices of the AU, the government of Chad mediated 
the signing of the N’Djamena Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement between the 
Government of Sudan, the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army, and the Sudanese Justice 
and Equality Movement.4 The ceasefire agreement, although rushed (in fact, it exists in 
two versions without an agreed upon text, which has at points led to confusion in its 
implementation), provided the basis for subsequent diplomatic and peacekeeping efforts in 
Darfur, the first of which was AMIS.5 Building upon the N’Djamena Agreement, the AU 
dispatched an assessment mission to Darfur the following month, which “recommended 
the immediate establishment of a humanitarian ceasefire commission.”6 This commission 
became operational in June 2004 and included 60 military observers with a protection force 
of 310 troops, primarily from Rwanda and Nigeria, which were to provide security for the 
mission.7  
 Lacking comprehensive strategic capacities and sufficient military resources, the 
AU faced a daunting task under the direction of the N’Djamena Agreement. Yet, by 
                                                 
3 De Waal 2007, 1039. 
4 Anyidoho 2012, 44. 
5 De Waal 2007, 1041. 
6 Anyidoho 2012, 44-5. 
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exceeding its mandate and improvising, AMIS made significant progress in its first year of 
operation, assisted by a ceasefire between the government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s 
Liberation Army in April 2005 that formally ended the civil war in the country. This 
success, however, was short-lived. The initial gains AMIS made “needed to be 
consolidated by a stronger mandate, a more realistic concept of operations, larger numbers 
and better logistics,” as well as increased financing.8 Both the AU and international donors 
promised to provide this support, but ultimately, they did not deliver.9 The observers and 
those sent to protect them were spread incredibly thin, and the AU struggled to provide 
direction and support to the small mission. Again and again, the AU revised the mission, 
providing additional equipment and troops, “but it became obvious that it could not cope 
with the complexities of the situation.”10  
Other organizations stepped in to assist the AU but ultimately were unable to 
significantly help the fledgling mission. In 2005, UNSC 1590 established the United 
Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS), which was mandated to monitor the 
implementation of a new peace agreement and to protect the rights and lives of civilians in 
the country. 11  This mission—much like AMIS—was limited and did little to better 
conditions on the ground in Sudan. Both the EU and NATO contributed support to the AU 
mission. In particular, the EU provided equipment, assets, planning and technical 
assistance, and observers. It also trained AU troops and police and provided tactical and 
                                                 
8 De Waal 2007, 1041.  
9 Ibid., 1041.  
10 Anyidoho 2012, 44-5. 
11 Fanchini 2011, Table of Multilateral Peace Operations, 120.  
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strategic transportation.12 While the EU contributed hundreds of millions of dollars to 
AMIS, such funds were only a fraction of the operation’s overall, which was nearly $1 
billion. Further, EU restrictions on what the money could fund meant that the 
organization’s assistance often did not in fact provide the AU with the equipment it needed 
to conduct its operation in Sudan.13 NATO offered logistical and technical support to the 
AU, which assisted its operations in Darfur, but did not overcome the AU’s significant lack 
of military equipment, such as helicopters.14 Moreover, despite a willingness on the part of 
both organizations to collaborate to provide assistance for the AU, no agreements were 
reached to coordinate the two organizations’ efforts, resulting in duplication and confusion 
in the field.15 
 With AMIS struggling and violence increasing, the AU turned to the UN for much 
needed assistance. In January 2006, the AU issued a communiqué in Addis Ababa that 
expressed support for a transition from AMIS to a UN operation in Darfur.16 The proposal 
drew upon the lessons of Burundi and imagined AMIS, much like AMIB, serving as an 
initial phase of a two-part operation that the UN would take over upon stabilization on the 
ground. Unlike in Burundi, however, the AU had neither a set date of departure nor an exit 
strategy for Sudan, leaving the young organization overstretched in the country. 17 
Nevertheless, the UNSC took several steps to pass UNSC 1706 in August 2006, which 
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would have expanded the mandate of UNMIS to deploy to Darfur.18 Despite the approval 
of the UNSC, however, Resolution 1706 was strongly and vehemently rejected by the 
government in Khartoum, which contended that such actions would be a gross violation of 
its sovereignty. With the sequential model off the table, the UN and AU were forced to 
develop an alternative method of cooperation.19 
 Following the rejection of Resolution 1706 and further consultations in Addis 
Ababa, the two organizations established a three-step approach to peacekeeping in Darfur 
to relieve and eventually replace AMIS, which continued to struggle. The first two steps in 
this process were a light support package from the UN to AMIS (including military staff 
officers, police and civilian advisers, and materiel such as armored personnel carriers), 
followed by a heavy support package to the AU mission (including thousands of military, 
police, and civilian personnel). The final and most important piece in the puzzle was to be 
a hybrid UN-AU operation in Darfur.20 The two organizations agreed that the UN would 
take responsibility for command and control of the operation and that “the overall 
management of the operation would be based on UN standards, principles and established 
practices.” 21  However, in accordance with the conditional demand of the Sudanese 
government that any operation inside its borders maintain an “African character,” the two 
organizations agreed that the Chairperson of the AU Commission and the Secretary-
General of the UN would jointly appoint the head of the operation, the Joint Special 
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Representative. Further, the Chairperson of the AU Commission, in consultation with the 
UN Secretary-General, would select the Force Commander of the mission, who would be 
required to be African.22 These measures were unprecedented even for multilateral peace 
operations, which often delegated different roles to respective organizations but did not go 
so far as to integrate the development and control of the mission. 
 Building upon these agreements, the AUPSC’s 79th Communiqué on the Situation 
in Darfur and UNSC Resolution 1769 established UNAMID under Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter in 2007. The operation was mandated to restore a secure environment, “protect the 
civilian population, facilitate humanitarian assistance, monitor the implementation of 
related ceasefire agreements, and promote the rule of law and human rights” in Darfur.23 
In pursuit of these objectives, and “stressing the urgent need to mobilise the financial, 
logistical and other support and assistance,” the two organizations agreed that UNAMID 
would contain a military component of nearly 20,000 personnel and a civilian component 
of several thousand police personnel.24 The developers of the mission also agreed that 
UNAMID would incorporate AMIS personnel and the UN support packages to the AU 
operation.25 With AMIS re-hatted as the AU-UN hybrid operation, the UN developed both 
finance mechanisms and support systems for the mission.26 Such measures contributed to 
far more robust, comprehensive, and sustained operations on the ground in Darfur. 
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 Despite enjoying increased support, however, UNAMID has faced a multitude of 
challenges, many of them stemming from its unprecedented nature. As UNAMID’s former 
Under Joint Special Representative Henry Anyidoho notes, the UN and AU did not always 
agree with the political approach to the mission, despite meetings involving both 
organization and the government of Sudan.27  The hybridity of the mission has posed 
problems of accountability and ownership, both because neither organization has 
developed specific policies and procedures for such operations, and because neither 
organization feels completely in charge of the direction and execution of the mission. These 
questions over ownership translate into difficulties on the ground, as diluted accountability 
has negatively impacted the efficiency of the operation, affecting areas such as financing, 
mobilization, and command and control.28 It is therefore difficult to assess the mission’s 
interorganizational dynamics—the concept of hybridity suggests a high level of integration 
and coordination between the two organizations, yet the competitive realities on the ground 
suggest otherwise. 
 The case of Sudan offers important insight into interorganizational coordination 
within the peacekeeping regime complex. The remainder of this chapter seeks to explore 
the dynamics within UNAMID, which has witnessed competition between the AU and the 
UN for command and control despite an influx of resources and capacity. It argues that 
explanations of organizational identity can account for the contradiction between 
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UNAMID’s theoretically hybrid, cooperative structure and the competition that emerged 
between the AU and the UN on the ground. 
  
Classification of Coordination 
 The case of Sudan presents an interesting challenge of classification for two reasons. 
First, the situation on the ground transitioned from primarily an AU mission, AMIS, to a 
joint AU-UN mission, UNAMID, meaning that two distinct periods of coordination 
emerge within the analysis. It will be helpful, then, to consider Sudan as two “subcases” 
that correspond chronologically to the two types of coordination witnessed. That being said, 
the analysis will mainly focus on the development and execution of UNAMID as a hybrid 
operation. Second, the level of integration within UNAMID was unprecedented at the time 
and remains a unique case even today. As a result, there exists no standard methodology 
for examining these types of integrated missions. Nevertheless, it is important to 
understand the dynamics within the hybrid arrangement, as it offers a significantly different 
approach to peace operations than either the sequential or the parallel models. 
 The first stage of operations in Sudan—consisting primarily of AMIS—was an 
example of sequential operations, in which one organization immediately responds to a 
crisis and then another organization takes over at a later point.29 While the AU was given 
financial, technical, and logistical support by the EU, NATO, and the UN, this chapter 
instead focuses on the intended operational cooperation between the AU and the UN. The 
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majority of sequential operations exhibit a transfer of control from a regional or 
multinational organization to the UN.30 In the case of Sudan, however, this transfer was 
not as clearly delineated, with AMIS transitioning to a hybrid mission as opposed to a 
solely UN mission. Nevertheless, because AU officials had expected a handover to the UN 
from the outset of its mission in 2004 and operated as such, it is safe to analyze the first 
stage of the case as a sequential operation. 
 In contrast to AMIS, UNAMID falls under the rare classification of integrated 
operations, “missions in which two organizations share command or where one 
organization sub-ordinates its command to another.”31 The revolutionary hybrid nature of 
UNAMID’s assets, troops, development, and control clearly place the mission in the 
integrated category and set it apart significantly from other cooperative peace operations. 
It is important, however, to distinguish the intentions that the AU and the UN had for 
UNAMID from the mission’s realities: while planners envisioned a unique, new 
cooperative model, in actuality, the mission ran into coordinative challenges on the ground, 
as bureaucrats and officers within the two organizations grappled over strategic vision and 
operational command and control. Therefore, in its mandate, UNAMID may have 
introduced an innovative method of cooperation, but this fact must not overshadow the 
noncooperation witnessed in its execution. 
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Materialist Explanations and Evidence 
Starting with materialist explanations, it is important to first examine the respective 
financial and material statuses of the AU and the UN at the time of the transition to 
UNAMID. Before AMIS even deployed, it was clear that the AU faced serious challenges 
in terms of funding. The young organization—made up of states with their own severe 
economic struggles—lacked the wherewithal to finance the mission itself, and foreign 
donors such as the EU debated both if and how they should support the mission of a 
relatively unproven organization.32 Eventually, “around 20 donors provided funding for 
the start-up of the operation.”33 Even with these donors, though, the AU struggled with 
AMIS’s finances, as the organization was understaffed, and each donor provided its own 
instructions on how the money was to be spent and reported on.34 Therefore, the AU was 
eager to find a coordinative solution with other organizations—including NATO, the EU, 
and the UN—in order to keep AMIS afloat until the UN could take over. In fact, in its 
communiqué requesting a transition to a UN operation, the AUPSC explicitly recognized 
the “serious financial, logistical and other constraints facing” AMIS.35 As Joint Deputy 
AU-UN Special Representative of UNAMID Henry Kwame Anyidoho noted, “As it was, 
the mission [AMIS] was handicapped by donor support.”36 
 The UN, on the other hand, did not face the same financial challenges in Sudan. 
Within the AU-UN partnership, the UN clearly possessed a large relative advantage in 
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terms of resources, both financial and material. Before UNAMID even deployed, the UN 
provided the AU with a light support package, delivering much needed material assistance 
to AU troops on the ground in Darfur. 37  In the UNSC resolution authorizing the 
establishment of UNAMID, the UNSC stressed the “need to mobilise the 
financial…assistance required for AMIS” and called upon member states to assist in 
implementing arrangements to cover financial and material needs of the mission.38 The UN 
was successful in this task, and “when the AU was re-hatted as an AU-UN hybrid mission, 
the budget increased fourfold and funding and support was provided by the UN-assessed 
contribution financing mechanism and the UN’s mission support system.”39 Thus, the UN 
provided the financial backbone for UNAMID in Sudan. 
 The UN’s financial support, however, came with stipulations (intended to regulate 
and monitor spending) that led to operational competition between the UN and the AU. As 
Anyidoho states: 
One of the modalities for the establishment of UNAMID 
was that it would operate under UN rules and regulations. It 
has never been clear to me whether the UN and AU agreed 
on what that statement meant. On the part of the UN, once 
the mission was to be financially supported from the 
assessed contributions of the member states, everything had 
to be done according to established procedures. Often, long 
debates, meetings upon meetings between DPKO and 
AUPSC could not achieve an agreed position for both 
organisations.40 
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The AU was at the will of its donors, and as a young organization made up of relatively 
weak and uninfluential member states, it had little bargaining power to change that fact. 
One Kenyan diplomat explained that the AU is often hesitant to speak out against its 
funders and is willing to give up, to an extent, operational autonomy in exchange for 
resources.41 Nevertheless, disputes emerged between AU and UN officials regarding the 
procurement and use of resources. Further, because the AU mission was already in the 
process of transitioning into UNAMID, the heavy support package promised by the UN 
was never delivered, which would have provided the foundation for efficient operations; 
this failure on the part of the UN sowed even more competition and distrust between the 
two organizations.42 
 Ultimately, material factors produce mixed results in explaining interorganizational 
coordination in the case of UNAMID in Sudan. On the one hand, the AU’s dependency on 
the UN for materiel and finances and the UN’s reliance on the AU for personnel created a 
cooperative relationship within UNAMID. This relationship was in no way equal, but the 
UN most likely provided funds to the AU because it had a stake in the mission as well, 
given UNAMID’s hybrid nature. A failure by the AU and UNAMID would also be a failure 
for the UN. On the other hand, though, resources became a point of contention between the 
UN and the AU. Because the UN’s support also dictated in large part the nature of 
UNAMID’s processes and execution, cooperative funding on the part of the UN also meant 
competitive operations. Thus, materialist explanations result in unsatisfactory answers.  
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Organizational Dependency Explanations and Evidence 
 Organizational dependency explanations require an analysis of both the AU’s and 
the UN’s respective comparative advantages as AMIS transitioned to UNAMID. It is clear 
that the AU lacked the capacity to execute AMIS independently, leading to a need for 
external assistance, and that the UN benefited from AU contributions to UNAMID. Yet, 
claims that such dependency led to effective cooperation require further scrutiny. As Aning 
and Abdallah note, “Through UNAMID…cooperation between the AU and the UN in 
Darfur provided an opportunity for both organisations to exploit their comparative 
advantages, with the AU harnessing troops, responding as a stablisation force…with funds 
and logistics provided by the UN component.” 43  Evidence on the ground, however, 
suggests that this explanation may be too simplistic and that organizational dependency led 
to ambiguous explanations about cooperation and competition in Sudan.  
 In its request for a transition to a UN mission from AMIS, the AU explicitly 
recognized its numerous inadequacies in Sudan.44 In terms of logistical abilities, political 
personnel, and financial capacity, the AU struggled to provide the necessary components 
to sustain an effective, long-term mission.45 These inadequacies stemmed primarily from 
two factors. First, made up in large part of struggling states with limited political and 
financial capacity, the AU did not have the same donor base as organizations like the EU, 
NATO, and the UN. Second, the AU had planned for a short-term bridging mission and 
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had expected higher levels of support from other multilateral organizations, meaning that 
it had in many ways deliberately limited AMIS’s capacities.  
Nevertheless, the AU brought several significant advantages to the table that the 
UN did not have. First and foremost, the AU possessed the “trump card” of troops that 
could be deployed quickly. 46  For the UN, the challenge of finding willing and able 
countries to contribute troops to peace operations has been a persistent thorn in its side 
since the inception of the earliest peacekeeping missions. The UN, therefore, was 
dependent upon the existence of readily available AU troops. Second, the AU provided an 
element of regional legitimacy to UNAMID. Even if Khartoum’s initial refusal to allow 
UN peacekeepers in Sudan was a strategic move to maintain power in Darfur, the fact 
remains that the AU’s presence enabled the establishment of the mission and added “to the 
operation’s overall legitimacy towards the Khartoum government and among the Sudanese 
people.”47 Third, the AU “has demonstrated willingness…to respond to emergencies,” 
even with dangerous conditions on the ground. 48  With a higher threshold of stability 
required to take action, the UN was thereby dependent on the AU’s willingness to take on 
riskier tasks in Darfur.  
 Although certainly dependent on the AU for certain aspects of UNAMID, the UN 
also provided essential components to the mission that the AU simply did not have. In 
addition to the material resources noted in the section above, the UN provided the logistical 
and political capabilities necessary to maintain a long-term mission in Sudan. As Force 
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Commander Martin Luther Agwai of UNAMID states, although a rapid “lightly armed 
deployment [such as AMIS] can have a decisive effect on the ground…there needs to be a 
follow-on plan to sustain the original deployment.”49 He adds, “The UN is a supertanker 
of an organization: it can be slow to get going but is invariably impressive when it is up 
and running.” 50  Therefore, UN contributions were key in developing UNAMID as a 
sustained, efficacious operation. 
 While the AU’s and UN’s respective comparative advantages clearly created a 
relationship of mutual dependency between the two organizations, it is not clear that such 
dependency resulted in a cooperative relationship, as dependency explanations would 
expect. Instead, the joint contributions contributed to operational competition and 
confusion on the ground. The hybridity of these contributions posed “the problem of the 
mission’s accountability and ownership. Inevitably, an operation’s accountability and 
ownership are all the more difficult to identify as they fall within several institutional 
frameworks.”51 On the one hand, by contributing the majority of troops to UNAMID and 
fulfilling Khartoum’s request of the mission’s “African character,” the AU expected a 
certain level of control over operations. On the other hand, by providing much of the 
logistical and political framework of the mission, the UN felt that it should dictate much 
of the control over UNAMID. These convictions on the part of both the AU and the UN 
led to operational disputes over command and control regarding issues such as senior 
appointments.52  
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 In short, mutual dependence did not lead to mutual cooperation in the case of Sudan. 
On the contrary, the comparative advantages of the AU and the UN resulted in questions 
of autonomy and management, leading to confusion and competition on the ground. 
Therefore, dependency arguments fall short in explaining competition in Sudan. 
 
Organizational Identity Explanations and Evidence 
 The establishment of UNAMID was unprecedented within the peacekeeping 
regime complex, an almost experimental model of organizational hybridity. As one 
AUPSC document described it several years later, “In establishing UNAMID, the two 
institutions ventured into the practicalities of harnessing the advantages that the UN enjoys 
due to its universal character and those of the AU due to its regional character and other 
relevant factors. UNAMID is essentially an interesting experiment of marrying 
universalism and regionalism.” 53  While “interesting experiment” may understate the 
coordinative difficulties that the AU and the UN faced during the process, the statement 
recognizes the key role that organizational identities played in determining cooperation and 
competition in Sudan. In particular, the two organizations’ differing definitions of 
UNAMID’s “African character” led to coordinative challenges on the ground. 
 While supported by both organizations, UNAMID’s structural hybridity was not 
the result of cooperative inclinations based on deliberate choice or material pressure, but 
rather of political developments in Sudan. Instead, “The AU/UN Hybrid Mission was a 
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political compromise” for the Sudanese government, “expressed in Security Council 
resolution 1769 (2007), which characterized the new UNAMID operation as having a 
‘predominantly African character’ with joint command and control structures.” 54  Two 
points should be noted here. First, neither Khartoum nor the two organizations clearly 
defined what exactly an operation with a “predominantly African character” and joint 
command and control structures would look like. Anyidoho notes, “The hybrid operation 
stipulates a predominantly African mission, which has been interpreted in different forms 
and shapes even by the staff of UNAMID.”55 Second, UNAMID’s theoretical structural 
hybridity (that is, the intended integration on the part of the mission’s mandate) did not 
automatically lead to operational cooperation on the ground; on the contrary, it led to 
operational competition. Both issues were points of disagreement for the AU and the UN, 
which interpreted them in radically different ways. 
 Although AMIS faced roadblock after roadblock on the ground in Darfur, including 
countless logistical and operational difficulties such as the resupplying and transportation 
of its forces, the AU still took pride in its contributions “to the protection of the civilian 
population and the improvement of the security and humanitarian situation in Darfur.”56 
The young regional organization, looking to become a prominent security actor in Africa 
following its relative success in Burundi in 2003, saw UNAMID as an opportunity to 
partner with the well-established UN and solidifying this role. Even while recognizing 
AMIS’s inadequacies and requesting assistance from the UN, it continued to view itself 
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within a “framework of the partnership between the AU and the United Nations in the 
promotion of peace, security, and stability in Africa.”57 As a result of this self-identification, 
the AU expected the UN to recognize its contributions in Sudan in the form of equal 
leadership within UNAMID’s command and control structure. Further, the AU interpreted 
UNAMID’s “African character” as a genuine recognition of and request for African 
leadership within the operation. The reality, however, was far different: “Politically, one 
can question the kind of ownership that the AU has on UNAMID…given the structural and 
financial features of these missions.”58 Disputes over senior appointments and operational 
leadership ensued, with AU officers often feeling dismissed by UN officials, which utilized 
African troops and resources while seeming to downplay African leadership. In short, the 
AU viewed itself as an equal partner within UNAMID, yet officials felt that this notion 
was not reciprocated by the UN.59 
 While the establishment of UNAMID was technically a joint endeavor, the UN still 
viewed itself as the primary maintainer of international peace and security. And, because 
UNSC Resolution 1769 recognized “that the situation in Darfur, Sudan” continued “to 
constitute a threat to international peace and security,” UN officials naturally assumed their 
primacy over the AU within UNAMID’s command and control structure.60 In essence, 
despite the fact that the AU’s regionalism served as an enabling and legitimizing factor for 
the mission, the UN believed that its universalism should manifest in the form of increased 
command over the mission. Further, the UN interpreted UNAMID’s “African character” 
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being satisfied by troops “sourced from African countries” and the appointment of the AU-
UN Joint Special Representative.61 For the UN, UNAMID’s “African character” was not a 
recognition of the AU’s equal stake in control of the mission or its contributions to the 
situation in Sudan, but rather a requirement to be checked off in order to maintain the 
consent of the Sudanese government.  
 Such differing and opposing interpretations of each organization’s respective roles 
and identities within UNAMID can help explain why the two organizations ultimately 
chose to compete for command and control on the ground. UNAMID’s hybridity raised 
questions of ownership and challenges related to the organization’s respective conceptions 
of their roles within the peacekeeping regime complex, leading to tangible consequences. 
Ultimately, AU officials felt as though the UN was dismissing the AU’s desired role as an 
important security actor on the African continent, while UN officials interpreted this desire 
as a challenge to their primacy in the realm of peace and security. These clashing identities 
resulted in competition between the two organizations in Sudan, which played out in 
disputes over leadership appointments, control of resources and personnel, and the 
direction of UNAMID’s strategic vision. 
 
Conclusion 
 There can be no doubt that relationships of dependency regarding both resources 
and capabilities emerged between the AU and the UN during the transition from AMIS to 
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UNAMID. That being said, there is reason to question the validity of viewing this transition 
solely through the lenses of materialist and dependency explanations.  
Materialist explanations run into one key problem: dual causality. On the one hand, 
the organizations depended on each other’s resources, both in terms of materiel and 
personnel, creating a mutual contribution structure in order to achieve a shared goal, 
namely the stabilization of the Darfur region. As predicted by materialist explanations, this 
combination of mutual dependency and shared objectives led to elements of cooperation 
between the AU and the UN. On the other hand, however, material contributions led to 
issues of UNAMID’s ownership and command, leading to competition on the ground. 
Again, as predicted by materialist explanations, the existence of shared resources resulted 
in interorganizational competition. In essence, material explanations predicted two 
contradicting outcomes. Therefore, these arguments provide little help in providing a single 
causal explanation relating material resources to either cooperation or competition.  
Dependency explanations suffer from similar intellectual inconsistencies. Each 
organization brought respective comparative advantages to UNAMID, creating a system 
of cooperative contributions. Namely, the AU provided troops, regional legitimacy, and a 
willingness to operate in hostile environments, while the UN provided a universal political 
and logistical framework, in addition to material resources. Yet, in contrast to the 
predictions of dependency theory, this mutual dependence did not result in cooperation 
between the two organizations. Instead, UNAMID witnessed competition over command, 
control, and leadership.  
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The inadequacies of material and dependency explanations suggest that other 
factors must have contributed to the dynamic between the AU and the UN in Sudan. As 
was the case in the DRC, explanations of organizational identity can contribute to our 
understanding of the competition between the two organizations. The UN’s conception of 
itself as the primary maintainer of international peace and security can explain both why 
the UN chose to contribute financial and material resources, as well as its political and 
logistical capacities, while at the same time asserting its leadership within UNAMID, often 
at the expense of the AU. At the same time, the AU’s self-perceived role as a prominent 
security actor on the African continent and a partner to the UN can help explain why it 
decided to provide its regional legitimacy and troops, while also contending for increased 
control over UNAMID. These conceptions of identity resulted in tangible consequences by 
shaping how bureaucrats and officers from both organizations acted toward resources, 
capacities, and each other on the ground. Unlike materialist and dependency arguments, 
whose causal accounts contradict themselves, organizational identity explanations allow 
for increased flexibility in understanding how each organization’s respective 
understandings of themselves and each other led from cooperative contributions to 
competition on the ground in Sudan. 
 The case of UNAMID represents the value of expanding the understanding of the 
peacekeeping regime complex to incorporate how identities of international and regional 
organizations play a significant role in determining how they interact with each other. 
Moving beyond the existence of dependency structures based on resources and capacities, 
constructed roles and identities aid our comprehension of how organizations approach, 
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manipulate, and act upon these structures. In the case of Sudan, such explanations suggest 
that these factors are perhaps even more fundamental in understanding dynamics of 
interorganizational relationships.  
UNAMID is also important because it signifies that hybridity does not 
automatically imply effective cooperation. A common misconception about UNAMID is 
that the existence of an integrated framework via the mission’s mandate meant that the AU 
and the UN would successfully coordinate their efforts on the ground. In reality, however, 
the ambiguous and indecisive meaning of hybridity actually increased the difficulties of 
coordination in Sudan, creating a mission less effective than a typical UN operation.62 
While such hybridity was a political compromise specific to the case of Sudan, this reality 
nevertheless implies that more substantial steps should be taken by organizations in the 
future to dictate roles, responsibilities, and ownership of peace operations.
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CHAPTER V 
Divergence and Convergence: 
Competition and Cooperation in Mali 
 
 
he multilateral intervention on the part of NATO and other states during the 2011 
Libyan Civil War revitalized the international community’s interest in the potential 
of peace operations to mitigate conflict. In response to clear transgressions by the Gaddafi 
regime, the coalition acted under UNSC Resolution 1973, which authorized “the 
establishment of a no-fly zone and the taking ‘of all necessary measures…to protect 
civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack’ in Libya.”1 While the mission 
was successful in bringing an end to the immediate conflict, it had unintended effects. 
Combatants from Libya moved southwest to the country of Mali, where a lesser-known 
civil war has raged between the government and rebel forces since 2012. There, the 
combatants joined with insurgents and Malian Army deserters, further escalating the chaos. 
Since 2012, the country has witnessed AU, ECOWAS, EU, and UN peace operations, 
creating a complex web of interorganizational interplay. 
The case of peacekeeping in Mali is important because it has come to exemplify 
both interorganizational divergence and convergence. Initially, peace operations in the 
divided state were characterized by fierce competition between the AU and the UN. Both 
organizations intended to develop missions in Mali to follow up ECOWAS’s African-led 
International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA), but the UN ultimately succeeded with 
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the deployment of the UN Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), presenting 
considerable challenges for a coherent and unified approach.2 More recently, however, 
operations in Mali have witnessed effective coordination between the UN and the EU. 
Operating with support from the EU Training Mission in Mali (EUTM Mali), the EU’s 
civilian mission, and France’s Operation Serval, peacekeeping in Mali is experiencing a 
high degree of cooperation between the EU and the UN that has not been witnessed 
between the AU and the UN. This chapter seeks to explain the underlying conditions that 
account for these differing dynamics. It is important to note that the Mali case is ongoing 
and relatively new, having begun only in 2012. This fact presents several challenges in 
terms of collecting comprehensive and complete evidence. That being said, enough 
evidence exists at present to account for the differences between the interorganizational 
competition and cooperation. Further, the recent nature of the case has presented unique 
opportunities to incorporate primary evidence into explanations.  
 This chapter will proceed in four sections. First, the chapter will begin by briefly 
exploring the outbreak of conflict in Mali, as well as the numerous missions that have 
developed in the country. Second, it will classify the types of coordination that have 
occurred in Mali. Third, it will test the predictions of the three analytical frameworks using 
the available evidence, observing which ones best account for interorganizational 
coordination conditions. Lastly, the chapter will conclude with generalizable conclusions 
from the case of Mali and their implications for future peace operations. Ultimately, it 
                                                 
2 AUPSC 2013, Communiqué PSC/PR/COMM (CCCLXXI) of the 371st AU Peace and Security Council 
Meeting. 
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argues that the clashing leadership identities between the AU and the UN resulted in 
competition between the two organizations, while the complementary roles of the EU and 
the UN led to cooperation. 
 
Background 
 In January 2012, the Mouvement national pour la libération de l’Azawad 
(MNLA)—alongside armed groups including Ansar Dine, Al-Qaeda in the Islamic 
Maghreb (AQIM), the Mouvement pour l’unicité et le jihad en Afrique de L’Ouest 
(MUJAO), and deserters from the Malian armed forces—initiated attacks against the 
Malian Government in the northern region of the country. The rebellion was bolstered by 
well-equipped combatants returning from Libya following the fall of the Gaddafi regime, 
allowing the combined movement to stage devastating attacks on government forces.3 
These attacks weakened the government’s hold in the north and allowed the rebels to 
solidify a base of power. 
 On March 22, 2012, disaffected soldiers from defeated government units in the 
north mutinied, leading to a military coup d’état. A military junta, the Comité national pour 
le redressement de la démocratie et la restauration de l’Etat, took power in Mali, 
suspending the constitution and dissolving government institutions. This takeover 
accelerated the Malian state’s collapse in the north, and soon opposition groups overran 
Malian forces and proclaimed an independent State of Azawad in April. Meanwhile, 
                                                 
3 UN 2015, MINUSMA: United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali. 
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tensions began to emerge among the northern armed groups over leadership and vision, 
leading to further fragmentation and instability.4 The situation in Mali was bleak. 
 ECOWAS, with the backing of the AU, initially spearheaded the international 
community’s response to the crisis in Mali, along with the political support of the UN. 
Immediately following the coup d’état, ECOWAS attempted to mediate the crisis and 
provide assistance for a political transition in the country. The UN Secretary-General’s 
Special Representative for West Africa offered UN support to the Malian authorities, which 
subsequently requested capacity-building assistance in the areas of elections, governance, 
security sector reform, and humanitarian aid.5 These requests resulted in the creation of the 
United Nations Mission in Mali (UNOM) in January 2013. Under Resolution 2085, the 
UNSC decided that UNOM would provide support to ongoing political and security 
processes in Mali. Moreover, UNOM was to support the planning, deployment, and 
execution of ECOWAS’s AFISMA. Resolution 2085 also authorized ECOWAS’s mandate, 
which included rebuilding Mali’s defense forces, stabilizing the country, transitioning 
authority back to the Malian state, protecting civilians, and facilitating humanitarian 
assistance.6 The resolution also called for other states and international organizations to 
provide financial support, troops, and equipment to AFISMA. The EU answered this call 
primarily through financial support to the ECOWAS mission,7 which was also bolstered 
by troops and resources from AU member states both in and outside of ECOWAS.8 
                                                 
4 Ibid.  
5 Ibid. 
6 UN 2015, MINUSMA: United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali. 
7 Dundon and van der Lijn 2013, New Peace Operations in 2012, 72. 
8 Tardy 2014, 97. 
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 AFISMA was set to deploy in September 2013. In January 2013, however, the 
situation in Mali deteriorated rapidly when Islamic armed groups began advancing 
southwards toward the town of Konna, which is strategically located in the middle of the 
country. The groups defeated the Malian army forces and captured Konna, leading 
transitional authorities to call upon France—Mali’s former colonizer—to defend the 
country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. In response, France developed and deployed 
Operation Serval, which led ground operations and airstrikes against the armed groups. At 
the same time, the deployment of AFISMA was accelerated to counter the advancing 
opposition, and ECOWAS forces began to move into northern Mali in February.9 The 
deterioration of the situation in Mali also prompted the EU to issue Council Decision 
2013/34/CFSP, which authorized the deployment of EUTM Mali to facilitate operations 
on the ground by training and advising Malian forces.10 While multiple missions were 
present on the ground, though, it is important to note that AFISMA operated independently 
from EUTM Mali and Operation Serval, meaning that there was almost no integration or 
strategic consultation between them operationally, logistically, or financially. Nevertheless, 
the combined force of the African and European (primarily French) military operations 
alongside the Malian army significantly improved the security situation in Mali, inhibiting 
rebel activities and forcing terrorist and associated forces to withdraw.11 
 Despite these gains, however, significant security challenges persisted, including 
continued attacks by terrorists and armed groups. In particular, territorial integrity 
                                                 
9 UN 2015, MINUSMA: United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali. 
10 Dundon and van der Lijn 2013, New Peace Operations in 2012, 72. 
11 UN 2015, MINUSMA: United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali. 
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remained contested in the north, undermining governance and development. As a result, 
the transitional government in Mali requested a more comprehensive peacekeeping 
operation in the country to stabilize the situation.12 The AU and the UN both sought to 
answer this request, yet the UN’s effort ultimately won out with the creation of MINUSMA.  
Acting under UNSC Resolution 2100, adopted in April 2013, MINUSMA is 
mandated to support the political process in Mali, carry out stabilization tasks, protect the 
civilian population, monitor human rights violations, facilitate humanitarian assistance, 
and create the conditions for free and inclusive elections. Resolution 2100 also allows the 
mission to operate under robust rules of engagement, meaning that peacekeepers are 
enabled to use “all necessary means to address threats to the implementation of its 
mandate.”13 While the establishment of MINUSMA has resulted in a more sustained, 
established, and supported peacekeeping mission with increased capacity on the ground in 
Mali, however, it has also created significant strategic and political tension at all levels 
between the AU and the UN, which retained AU troops and assets.  
 In addition to bureaucratic and operational tensions, the establishment of 
MINUSMA also resulted in a tangible differences in interorganizational dynamics on the 
ground in Mali. As noted earlier, AFISMA operated simultaneously, but rarely in 
conjunction, with France’s Operation Serval and the EU’s EUTM Mali. Since the 
deployment of MINUSMA, however, more integrated and sustained cooperation has been 
witnessed in Mali,14 with EUTM Mali and Operation Serval acting in defined support of 
                                                 
12 Ibid. 
13 UNSC 2013, Resolution 2100. 
14 Tardy 2015, Interview.  
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the UN mission. 15  Mali is a particularly interesting case precisely because of these 
differences during and after the transition to MINUSMA. But what has accounted for 
competition between the AU and the UN, and cooperation between the EU and the UN? 
Utilizing the three analytical frameworks and the existing evidence, the remainder of this 
chapter seeks to answer this question.  
 
Classification of Coordination 
 As shown in the background above, the case of Mali has displayed complex 
interorganizational dynamics, rendering it difficult to classify the exact type of 
coordination between the multiple institutions involved. It will helpful, then, to consider 
Mali in two phases. 
 In the first phase, four missions operated simultaneously in Mali: AFISMA, UNOM, 
EUTM Mali, and France’s Operation Serval. Although it was a standalone mission, 
AFISMA—with the organizational and political support of UNOM—rapidly deployed 
with the intent of stabilizing the situation on the ground until a more sustained mission, 
whether under the AU or the UN, could be developed. Operation Serval, on the other hand, 
was developed independent of AFISMA as a short-term military operation to drive out 
militants in the northern areas of the country. Therefore, while loosely sharing strategic 
goals, the missions on the ground operated separate from each other with no integrated 
command or resource-sharing structures. With such limited coordination between 
                                                 
15 Tardy 2014, 97.  
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AFISMA, on the one hand, and Serval and EUTM Mali, on the other, these missions can 
just barely be classified as parallel operations. 
 The second phase began following the deployment of MINUSMA in 2013, which 
altered interorganizational dynamics in Mali significantly. Both Serval and EUTM Mali 
operated in more direct support of the UN mission—with relative autonomy, a clear 
division of labor, and little operational overlap—falling under the scope of parallel 
cooperation. In contrast, recent years have witnessed increased competition in Mali 
between the AU and the UN, with the latter incorporating many of AFISMA’s resources, 
troops, and assets. Disputes between the two organizations over matters of leadership, 
resources, and planning accompanied the transition from AFISMA to MINUSMA, which 
contains African troops and assets. The analysis of AU and UN relations will primarily 
focus on the transition period to MINUSMA, while analysis of EU and UN relations will 
focus on the cooperative relationship that emerged following the establishment of 
MINUSMA. 
 
Materialist Explanations and Evidence 
 Resource considerations played a significant, although not singularly causal, role 
in creating competition between the AU and the UN in Mali, even before the establishment 
of MINUSMA. The AU and ECOWAS’s original mission, AFISMA, was composed 
entirely of African troops but depended on a UN trust fund for the mission’s financing. 
This financing structure led to a dynamic of dependency of the AU and ECOWAS upon 
the UN, but also led to tensions regarding the allocation and transfer of funds. The UN was 
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slow to finance AFISMA through the trust fund, and African officials raised concerns about 
the system’s transparency over procurement and reimbursement processes.16 In the end, 
the UN’s monetary support was not enough to safe AFISMA from the “financial difficulties 
encountered by the African organizations,” 17  one of the several reasons for the 
development of MINUSMA.  
Yet, resource factors contributed to an even more contentious relationship between 
the organizations during the transition period for several reasons. First, the UN took over 
operations quickly, and during this turnaround period, donor states were reluctant to 
provide resources for AFISMA, feeling as their contributions would be inconsequential, as 
the mission was ending soon.18 In other words, donors strongly preferred to wait and fund 
MINUSMA (which they considered a more sustainable and stable operation) instead of 
sending valuable resource to the dwindling AFISMA, leaving the latter without sufficient 
funding for the remainder of the mission. Second, the UN was unclear how it would 
distribute the remainder of trust fund, leading to uncertainty whether the resources would 
go toward AFISMA, as originally intended, or MINUSMA.19 This uncertainty caused a 
dispute between the UN and the AU, which claimed it was entitled to the resources. Third, 
the conditions of the takeover dictated that MINUSMA would retain AU troops and assets, 
while AU leadership was transferred almost completely to the UN.20 These stipulations 
caused a rift between the AU and the UN, even leading ECOWAS’s most powerful member 
                                                 
16 Akpasom 2016, Interview. 
17 Tardy 2014, 104.  
18 De Coning 2016, Interview.  
19 Akpasom 2016, Interview. 
20 De Coning 2016, Interview. 
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state, Nigeria, to pull out its assets from Mali.21 Therefore, while a relationship of resource 
sharing existed between the AU, ECOWAS, and the UN over finances, materiel, and troops, 
material factors facilitated competition on the ground in Mali.  
 Meanwhile, although MINUSMA, Operation Serval, and EUTM Mali did not 
integrate or aggregate their resources in Mali, material factors partially explain the parallel 
cooperation that emerged between the three missions for two reasons. First, the three 
missions shared the same main objective of stabilizing Mali in an effort to solidify the 
transitional government’s control of the country’s “sovereignty, unity and territorial 
integrity.”22 This common goal created an incentive for cooperation between the operations. 
Second, each mission enjoyed substantial material support from their respective financial 
backers, so scarcity was not a major problem. The EU, France, and the UN (utilizing AU 
assets and troops) all had enough resources to fund self-sufficient operations on the ground 
in Mali, and therefore, the type of material dependence structure that existed between the 
UN and the AU simply did not manifest between the three. These factors helped contribute 
to a strategic, parallel cooperation, as “the feasibility of operations like…MINUSMA in 
Mali would have been very different in the absence of…Operation Serval.”23 They also, 
however, encouraged autonomous operation on the ground in a manner similar to MONUC 
and Operation Artemis in the DRC. Without the necessity of resource sharing, the missions 
remained separate in terms of command and control structures, as predicted by materialist 
explanations.  
                                                 
21 Akpasom 2016, Interview. 
22 UNSC 2012, Resolution 2085.  
23 Tardy 2014, 104.  
108 
TATE Q. KRASNER 
 For the EU, France, and the UN, material factors can partly explain why, with 
shared goals and abundant resources, the three missions chose to pursue parallel 
cooperation on a strategic level but chose to operate autonomously on the ground. As for 
the AU and the UN, materialist explanations lead to somewhat more indefinite results. 
While the two organizations shared troops, materiel, and finances, creating a relationship 
of mutual dependency, shared finite resources contributed to competition, raising questions 
over transparency, command, and control. Overall, though, materialist explanations are 
lacking in providing a full causal account of the cooperation and competition that took 
place in Mali. In other words, tensions may have existed over resources between the AU 
and the UN, but materialist arguments do not explain why the two organizations were 
competitive over these factors in the first place. Similarly, an abundance of resources may 
illuminate why there was little contention regarding resources between the EU and the UN, 
but again, materialist arguments do not give a causal account about why the organizations 
then chose to pursue cooperation. This shortcoming suggests a separate, more fundamental 
explanation. 
 
Organizational Dependency Explanations and Evidence 
 Similar to other cases of peace operations involving the AU and the UN, a structure 
of mutual dependence based on comparative advantages and capacities emerged between 
the AU and the UN with the establishment of MINUSMA. In addition to the material and 
financial resources that the UN provided the AU and ECOWAS through its trust fund, the 
UN contributed a level of functional and logistical expertise that responded to the 
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AFISMA’s significant operational challenges.24 With decades of experience managing and 
deploying peace operations, the UN provided MINUSMA with the operational leadership 
necessary for a sustained mission. Further, the UN added a more substantial political 
element to MINUSMA, creating a stronger framework for the operation. 
 The AU, besides providing troops and military assets, contributed other factors to 
MINSUMA upon which the UN was dependent. First, the AU gave MINUSMA an element 
of regional legitimacy in Mali, whereas the UN was perceived by the local populace as an 
outsider. As one African official noted, human rights observers from ECOWAS and the 
AU were able to interact and communicate far more effectively with locals than UN 
observers, as they shared linguistic and cultural connections with the civilian population.25 
Second, the AU and ECOWAS were far more willing to place their troops in risker peace 
enforcement roles throughout Mali, a critical factor, considering the contradicting points 
that UNSC Resolution 2100 called for robust rules of engagement26 but that conditions on 
the ground did not reach the threshold of stability required to deploy UN troops.27  
 In sum, a relationship of dependency emerged between the AU and the UN through 
the establishment of MINUSMA, with the AU providing the personnel backbone and 
regional legitimacy, and the UN providing a strong political, operational, and civilian 
framework. Despite this mutually dependent relationship, however, the AU and the UN 
experienced competition on the ground. This competition was due in large part to the fact 
that, during the transition to MINUSMA, leadership of the mission transitioned almost 
                                                 
24 Tardy 2014, 104.  
25 Akpasom 2016, Interview.  
26 UNSC 2013, Resolution 2100. 
27 Akpasom 2016, Interview.  
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entirely to the UN, which utilized the AU’s advantages.28 As was the case in Sudan, mutual 
contributions did not lead to mutual leadership, causing tensions and struggles for power 
between the organizations. 
 As for the EU and the UN, while the two organizations performed specialized 
functions in support of overall operations in Mali, the relative self-sufficiency and 
autonomy of the missions facilitated the emergence of parallel cooperation. On the ground 
in Mali, this cooperation was achieved primarily through a clear division of labor and little 
operational overlap between MINUSMA, Operation Serval, and EUTM Mali. 29 
MINUSMA took on the role as the overarching operation in Mali, serving as the 
predominant peace operation on the ground and featuring a robust political and strategic 
framework. Both Operation Serval and EUTM Mali—along with the EU’s civilian 
component on the ground—provided specialized support to the UN mission. Operation 
Serval, although not multinational organization’s mission, nevertheless contributed a 
strong military component to efforts in Mali. The EU’s role on the other hand, was confined 
mainly to the training of the Malian army through EUTM Mali and the EU’s civilian 
mission.30 Yet, while these missions contributed essential functions that—as a whole—
resulted in a coherent, multilateral effort, they also remained self-sufficient due to their 
capable backers. Unlike with the AU and the UN’s relationship within MINUSMA, the 
EU, France, and the UN all possessed not only the material resources, but also the 
operational capacity to organize, deploy, and control their respective missions. In sum, a 
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29 Tardy 2015, Interview.  
30 Tardy 2014, 113.  
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lack of both overlap and dependency thereby facilitated parallel cooperation on the ground 
in Mali. 
Dependency explanations can help illuminate why the EU, France, and the UN 
chose to cooperate strategically but not operationally, while they produce more ambiguous 
results for the AU, ECOWAS, and the UN. In the case of the former, clearly defined 
objectives and a lack of dependency facilitated the actors to perform their strategic niche 
functions autonomously without operational competition on the ground, leading to parallel 
cooperation. In the case of the latter, however, mutual dependence—in contrast to 
dependency theory’s explanations—led to intense competition. Despite each side 
contributing key elements to MINUSMA, disputes over leadership, command, and control 
emerged. Therefore, dependency explanations do not fully account for cooperation and 
competition in Mali. Further, they suggest an external, underlying explanation of what 
caused the organizations to act either cooperatively or competitively toward these 
structures of dependency. 
 
Organizational Identity Explanations and Evidence 
 Conceptions of organizational roles and identities can also contribute to an 
understanding of interorganizational dynamics in the case of Mali. While diverging 
conceptions of identity between the AU, ECOWAS, and the UN led to organizational 
competition on the ground, mutually reinforcing identities between the EU and the UN 
allowed for parallel cooperation. 
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 The establishment of MINUSMA led to significant tensions between the AU and 
the UN regarding organizational identities and roles, resulting in competition on the ground. 
For the AU, the operation’s creation de facto dismissed its desire to establish its own 
follow-up mission to AFISMA. In a communiqué following the adoption of Resolution 
2100 in April of 2013, the AUPSC stated “with concern” that “Africa [had] not [been] 
appropriately consulted in the drafting and the consultation process that led to the adoption 
of the resolution authorizing MINUSMA.”31 It went on to state that the resolution did not 
“take into account the concerns formally expressed by the AU and ECOWAS,” and that 
the situation [was] not in consonance with the spirit of partnership that the AU and the UN 
have been striving to promote for many years, on the basis of the provision of Chapter VIII 
of the UN Charter.”32 African officials on the ground perceived that the UN came in with 
an attitude of condescension to talks over logistics, standardization, command, and control 
in Addis Ababa during the planning phases, dismissing ECOWAS and the AU’s 
contributions in Mali.33  
AU officials felt that the UN’s approach, as well as its questionable financial 
transparency and exclusive leadership, represented a dismissal of the AU’s efforts, not only 
highlighting tensions between the organizations, but also pointing to underlying debates 
regarding their fundamental roles and identities.34 Through AFISMA, the AU sought to 
reinforce its role as a prominent security actor on the African continent willing to take more 
                                                 
31 AUPSC 2013, Communiqué PSC/PR/COMM (CCCLXXI) of the 371st AU Peace and Security Council 
Meeting. 
32 Ibid.  
33 Akpasom 2016, Interview.  
34 Ibid. 
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robust action in support of the upholding of international peace and security.  Officials with 
the AU and ECOWAS also prided themselves on developing “African solutions for African 
problems,” further solidifying their operational legitimacy.35 Moreover, the AU wanted to 
be perceived as an equal actor with the UN on the ground in Mali, but the removal of 
African leadership of MINUSMA contributed to perceptions of an unequal dynamic. Thus, 
even before MINUSMA was deployed, animosity existed between the AU and the UN, 
resulting in competition on the ground.  
The UN’s conception of itself also played a role in its competition with the AU 
during the development of MINUSMA. First, the UN felt that its role as the primary 
maintainer of international peace and security was again being challenged. Acting under 
Chapter VIII of the UN charter, UN officials within MINUSMA saw the AU and 
ECOWAS as fulfilling support roles within the mission, not taking on equal roles related 
to command and control. In effect, UNSC Resolution 2100, which authorized the 
establishment of MINUSMA, called for the absorption of “AFISMA military and police 
personnel” while simultaneously demanding that these forces would be “appropriate to 
United Nations Standards.”36 These conditions were essentially unilateral, requiring the 
AU to conform to UN operational standards while remaining subservient. 
Second, the UN maintained stricter conditions for leadership selection, priding 
itself upon the integrity and reliability of its leadership, while also questioning the 
standards of AU leadership, which had a questionable record of employing unreliable and 
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unpredictable officers; more specifically, the UN voiced concerns over the AU’s selection 
of commanders in Somalia and Mali. These differences led the UN to refuse to accept the 
AU head of mission37 and pursue overall command and control of MINUMSA through the 
appointment of a “Special Representative for Mali and Head of Mission of MINUSMA.”38 
While this position has hitherto been filled by officials from Tunisia and Chad, representing 
a slight concession to the AU, its orders and oversight still come directly from the UN, a 
point which has diminished the AU’s actual control over the mission. 
Third, given its vast experience in peace operations—as well its political and 
logistical contributions—the UN viewed itself as the natural leader for operations in Mali, 
leading to its dismissal not only of the AU and ECOWAS’s desire for an African follow-
up mission to AFISMA, but also of its logistical, military, and financial capacities.39 These 
conceptions played a role throughout MINUSMA’s planning process, with the UN taking 
steps to solidify its authority over the mission.  
In contrast, conceptions of organizational roles and identities facilitated parallel 
cooperation between the EU and the UN. Through earlier peace operations in Africa, the 
EU had developed itself as a regional organization unwilling to take on expansive military 
campaigns, but prepared to support UN peace operations in the form of small, specialized, 
and autonomous niche missions.40 Unlike the AU, which was attempting to solidify its 
credibility as an effective peace and security actor by embarking on risker operations 
verging on peace enforcement, the EU chose to prioritize manageable missions in an effort 
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39 De Coning 2016, Interview.  
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to avoid mission creep.41 Prior negative experiences of EU officials with the UN in Bosnia 
and the DRC had led them to deliberately construct an identity as security actor that did 
not get embroiled in overstretched missions. Through this identity, the EU made it clear to 
other organizations that it would only take on limited roles. 42  In this way, strategic 
subservience to the UN was a small price to pay for both operational autonomy and limited 
responsibility; moreover, not having operational control over MINUSMA was actually 
perceived as a positive by EU officials, who were happy for the UN to take on the lofty 
task of spearheading peace operations in Mali. Further, repeated interactions with the UN 
in the DRC, the Central African Republic, and Chad led to an enhanced, well-established 
cooperative framework, both formal and informal, between the two organizations.43 In this 
way, both the EU and the UN had clear expectations for where each organization would fit 
into the larger strategic framework. These expectations were reinforced by open and 
sustained communication between missions: EUTM Mali, the EU’s civilian mission, and 
MINUSMA all placed liaison officers in each other’s respective headquarters in order to 
facilitate coordination between the three.44  
The EU’s role as a supportive, albeit autonomous, partner—evidenced by its 
contributions of military capacities and training mission without simultaneous demands for 
command and control over MINUSMA—fit well with the UN’s overall conception of 
operations in Mali, which viewed MINUSMA as the overarching mission with specialized 
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components coming from other organizations.45 These complementary roles allowed for 
cooperation between the two organizations. Whereas UNSC Resolution 2100 called 
explicitly for AU and ECOWAS troops and assets to be consolidated into MINUSMA, 
thereby transferring leadership to the UN as well, its references to the EU recognized the 
organization’s autonomous contributions to UN operations in Mali through both EUTM 
Mali and other civilian components.46 Positions like those articulated in the resolution 
reinforced the dynamic of parallel cooperation and the mutual respect for operational 
autonomy created through repeated interactions conducting peace operations, particularly 
in Africa.47 These repeated interactions allowed officials within the organizations to act 
upon intersubjective understandings of what the institutions could expect each other to 
contribute and how they could expect each other to act during peace operations. In other 
words, clear ideas and well-defined roles from the outset of where each organization would 
fit within the overall scheme directly resulted in the EU and the UN choosing to act 
cooperatively in Mali, knowing that they had a reliable and coordinative partner with an 
established history.  
In short, organizational roles and identities can deepen understanding of 
interorganizational cooperation and competition in the case of Mali. For the AU, ECOWAS, 
and the UN, differing understandings over each organization’s roles, identities, and 
contributions led to competition on the ground over leadership, resources, and operational 
control. On the other hand, for the EU and the UN, mutually reinforcing organizational 
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identities resulted in parallel cooperation between the two organizations, whose shared 
experiences allowed for increased knowledge of what each should and would do on the 
ground.  
 
Conclusion 
 The case of Mali is particularly important because it can be disaggregated as two 
simultaneous cases of interorganizational interplay: in the one case, the AU and ECOWAS 
competed with the UN; in the other, the EU and the UN cooperated. Materialist and 
dependency arguments can partially explain these differing dynamics, but ultimately result 
in unsatisfying and incomplete answers. In many ways, regarding the transition from 
AFISMA, MINUSMA was “a response to the operational and financial difficulties 
encountered by the African organizations.” 48  A relationship of dependency indeed 
emerged between the UN, which provided financing, a political framework, and logistical 
capabilities, and the African organizations, which provided troops, military assets, regional 
legitimacy, and a willingness undertake risky operations on the ground. As was the case in 
Sudan, though, mutual dependency did not lead to operational cooperation; on the contrary, 
disputes erupted between the leadership of the organizations over how the mission should 
look and be conducted using shared resources and capacities. These arguments do, however, 
apply more aptly to the relationship between the EU and the UN, in which an abundance 
of resources, a lack of dependency, and practically no overlap in mandate allowed the 
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organizations to pursue parallel cooperation. Nevertheless, they fail to explain the direct 
causal relationship between resources and capacities and the variation in outcomes. 
 Ultimately, explanations of organizational roles and identities lead to a far more 
complete and fundamental account of competition and cooperation in Mali. For the AU, 
ECOWAS, and the UN, competing and misunderstood identities led to unclear conceptions 
of how MINUSMA would be developed, and deployed, and operated in Mali. The African 
organizations, looking to play a more prominent security role alongside the UN, felt as 
though their contributions through AFISMA were being dismissed, while the UN, which 
viewed itself as the primary maintainer of international peace and security, sought to 
preserve its leadership of the mission. The organizations believed that their respective 
contributions, both in terms of resources and capabilities, reinforced their constructed 
identities. These divergences were further amplified by poor communication and a lack of 
transparency regarding processes such as materiel procurement, troop reimbursements, and 
personnel management. Altogether, these factors resulted in competition on the ground, a 
serious blow to what had been developing as one of the deepest interorganizational security 
partnerships. As for the EU and the UN, mutually reinforcing identities and roles, 
established through years of consistent organizational coordination, facilitated parallel 
cooperation in Mali between MINUSMA, EUTM Mali, and the EU’s civilian mission. 
Clear expectations, intersubjective understandings, and mutual respect for operational 
autonomy formed the basis of a well-defined cooperative framework.  
 The case of Mali further aids understanding of interorganizational cooperation and 
competition within the peacekeeping regime complex, as it juxtaposes two opposite 
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scenarios. While the evidence points to both materialist and dependency factors playing a 
role in these organizations’ decisions to cooperate and compete, conceptions of 
organizational roles expand the account to include the underlying motivations for these 
actions. In other words, these accounts do not only explain how issues such as financing 
and control structures influence decision-making, but also why organizations respond to 
these issues the way that they do. Ultimately, this approach provides a far more 
comprehensive understanding of interorganizational dynamics.
CHAPTER VI 
The Case of the Missing Tires: 
Coordination in Somalia 
 
 
s the AU’s efforts to restore order to Somalia dragged on, AMISOM’s commanders 
on the ground were faced with a problem—they were running out of tires. During 
the planning phase of the operation, the UN had agreed to provide support systems to the 
AU mission, which was to conduct the vast majority of operations on the ground. Amongst 
other means of support, the UN was to supply the AU forces with medical equipment, 
ammunition, and tires.1 The AU operation, however, was far outpacing the UN’s ability to 
resupply the mission, and soon commanders were struggling to equip their troops with 
adequate resources to complete their mandates of protection and reconciliation.2 The AU 
was literally burning rubber faster than it could be replaced, and the lives of both AU troops 
and Somali civilians were at risk.  
 While the UN and the AU eventually came together to address these logistical 
issues through better planning and communication, the account of the missing tires 
illustrates the intricate difficulties of establishing interorganizational cooperation during 
peacekeeping operations, as well as the human consequences of failing to adequately and 
effectively do so. This chapter examines coordination between the AU, the EU, and the 
UN in their efforts to stabilize Somalia. In doing so, it seeks to determine the conditions 
and motivations that have led to cooperation during the operation. Ultimately, it argues that, 
                                                 
1 De Coning 2016, Interview. 
2 Gadin 2012, 75. 
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while material and dependency arguments provide partial accounts for cooperation in 
Somalia, explanations of organizational identities illuminate the foundation of 
complementary roles on the ground. 
Somalia is a particularly relevant and illuminating case for several reasons. First, 
the mission has witnessed the active participation of a number of institutional actors since 
its inception, and these organizations have played diverse and well-defined roles. Second, 
as the anecdote suggests, interorganizational coordination in Somalia has evolved over 
time, providing an opportunity to examine how changing conditions have affected 
institutional cooperation. Lastly, while the fact that peacekeeping remains an ongoing 
effort in Somalia means that final outcomes have yet to be determined, the contemporary 
nature of the case has presented a wide array of primary sources and firsthand accounts 
from commanders, policymakers, and bureaucrats. Taken together, the dynamic case of 
Somalia provides critical insight into the question of interorganizational cooperation within 
the peacekeeping regime complex.  
 It will begin with a short background outlining the mission in Somalia and the 
changing roles of the international institutions involved. Next, it will briefly classify the 
type of coordination occurring on the ground. It will then examine the three analytical 
frameworks in light of the existing evidence, seeing which holds up best to the facts of the 
case. The chapter will conclude by drawing out generalizable conclusions about 
interorganizational cooperation from the case of Somalia.  
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Background 
 AMISOM is not the first peacekeeping mission in Somalia. In the early 1990s, the 
country witnessed several as the international community attempted to respond to the 
outbreak of brutal civil war. The UN developed United Nations Operation in Somalia 
(UNOSOM) I and II, which—alongside the US-led Unified Task Force (UNITAF)—
sought to quell the conflict and provide humanitarian assistance to the civilian population.3 
Following the disastrous Battle of Mogadishu in 1993, the US decided to withdraw from 
Somalia, which led to the demise of peacekeeping efforts in the country. Without a 
sustained commitment on the ground, the ultimate result of these earlier missions was a 
failure to create the stable conditions necessary for a lasting peace, and factional conflict 
soon erupted again in the following decade over religious and political power struggles. 
These struggles boiled over in May 2005 during the Second Battle of Mogadishu, during 
which Islamic Courts Union militia defeated the Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and 
Counter-Terrorism—formed by Somali warlords—for control of Somalia’s capital.  
 This development concerned Somalia’s regional neighbors, as well countries like 
the United States, who feared links between the Islamic Courts Union and Al-Qaeda.4 Thus, 
on January 19, 2007, the AUPSC authorized the deployment of AMISOM for an initial 
period of six months. The force was to include 8,000 military personnel, 270 civilian police 
officers, and a civilian component, drawing upon contributions from a multitude of African 
states.5 During the development and planning of AMISOM, the AU believed that the 
                                                 
3 Bellamy 2016, Interview. 
4 Van der Lijn 2013, Regional Developments in Peace Operations, 76. 
5 Gadin 2012, 75.  
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mission would provide initial stabilization, much like its mission in Burundi, and that the 
UN would subsequently deploy its own peacekeeping mission in Somalia.6 This plan had 
been echoed by the UN, leading the AU to plan not for a sustained, long-term mission, but 
rather for a short-term enforcement operation, resembling a military operation more than a 
traditional peacekeeping mission. A month later, the UNSC adopted Resolution 1744, 
which endorsed AMISOM and authorized the operation to take “all necessary measures”7 
to support dialogue and reconciliation, protect the transitional federal government, provide 
security for key infrastructure, assist in the establishment and training of Somali security 
forces, and contribute to the creation of the security conditions necessary to provide 
humanitarian assistance. These measures would not only help to stabilize Somalia, whose 
fledgling transition government was essentially exiled abroad, but also help to solidify the 
stability of East Africa, an outcome desired by Somalia’s neighbors such as Kenya.8 
Following the UNSC’s authorization, the AU requested that the UN assign planners to 
support preparation for the deployment of AMISOM. The request was approved by the 
UNSC with little fanfare, and in June, the UN planning team was “deployed to the AU 
Commission to provide technical and expert advice on planning and managing 
AMISOM.”9 
 The following year, on February 20, 2008, former AU Commission Chair Alpha 
Oumar Konaré requested additional support from the UN in the form of a logistical support 
                                                 
6 AUPSC 2012, Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Partnership between the African 
Union and the United Nations of Peace Security: Towards Greater Strategic and Political Coherence, 17-8. 
7 UNSC 2007, Resolution 1744.  
8 Rotich 2015, Interview. 
9 Gadin 2012, 75. 
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package—estimated to cost over $800 million—to facilitate AMISOM’s deployment.10 
Given its heavily military nature, AMISOM was a massive undertaking for the 
underfunded AU, whose member states alone could not provide the financing for the 
mission. UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon responded to the request by outlining support 
based on two principles. First, UN support was to be aimed at assisting the AU to build its 
own institutional capacity to support AMISOM. Second, in preparation for the possibility 
of a UN peacekeeping operation in Somalia, the response stated that AMISOM should 
deploy as much as possible using UN standards in order to effectively facilitate a “blue-
hatting” transition of the mission. In essence, these measures kept the UN’s operations 
open regarding a follow-on mission. The first measure would bolster the AU’s operational 
independence in the case that the UN chose to delay deployment, while the second would 
prepare a more seamless transition to UN control when the organization finally decided to 
take over operations. Further, the UN Secretary-General’s proposal led to UNSC 
Resolution 1772, which allowed for the deployment of additional planners to Addis Ababa 
to assist in engineering, management, security, communications, and logistics, among 
other areas. Later that year, the UN also proposed to provide a logistics support package, 
including equipment and services, to raise the operational standards of AMISOM and build 
the capacity of Somali rule of law and security institutions.11 
 In its first two years following the AUPSC’s authorization, AMISOM encountered 
fierce resistance on the ground in Somalia. On January 16, 2009, the UNSC adopted 
                                                 
10 Ibid., 75. 
11 Ibid., 75-6. 
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Resolution 1863, which was significant for two reasons. First, the resolution expressed the 
UN’s “intent to establish a UN peacekeeping operation as a follow-on force to AMISOM, 
subject to a further decision of the Council.”12 Second, it approved the Secretary-General’s 
recommendations, which included the provision of the proposed logistics support package. 
This approval led to the development of the UN Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA), 
which was created to facilitate the delivery of the UN’s logistical support. Yet, although 
Resolution 1863 solidified UN support to AMISOM by providing equipment and services, 
it did not establish a transfer of UN funds to AMISOM.13 Instead of the direct donor 
support model developed for AMIS in Sudan, Resolution 1863 instead established a trust 
fund for AMISOM and solicited donors to contribute to the mission, a move which would 
allow the UN more oversight over contributions.14 Financially, the EU—with concerns 
over terrorism—has emerged as one of the most significant supporters of AMISOM, 
contributing millions of dollars towards personnel allowances, operational costs, and 
civilian components. 
Further, as security challenges persisted in Somalia following the adoption of 
Resolution 1863, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon advised the UNSC that the situation in 
Somalia would require more robust operations. More specifically, he recommended the 
deployment of a multinational force with significant military capabilities, as opposed to a 
traditional peacekeeping operation. Yet, it became increasingly clear—due to both volatile 
conditions on the ground and a lack of political will on the part of UN member states—that 
                                                 
12 Ibid., 76. 
13 Ibid., 76. 
14 UNSC 2009, Resolution 1863. 
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such a follow-on force would not be developed. “As attempts to raise such a force failed,” 
due to a lack of political will and reluctance to deploy amidst the chaos of Somalia on the 
part of the international community, “the UN Secretary-General explored other options, 
including UN support for AMISOM.”15 Nearly ten years later, this support still manifests 
primarily in the form of logistical and political assistance for the AU mission.  
 In its early years, even following Resolution 1863, AMISOM struggled to establish 
peace and security on the ground in Somalia, facing resistance from rebel factions, warlords, 
and extremist groups. Both AU commanders on the ground and bureaucrats in Addis Ababa 
came to the realization that their resources, troop levels, and mandates were not strong 
enough to counter the situation. As a result, the AU requested to the UN that AMISOM’s 
authorized troop level be increased from 8,000 to 12,000, a proposal that the UNSC 
endorsed in 2010 with Resolution 1964.16 That same year, the EU decided to establish the 
EU Training Mission in Somalia (EUTM Somalia), which sought to “strengthen the 
Federal Government of Somalia and Somali institutions by training and providing support 
to Somali security forces.”17 
 In 2012, many Western states took a renewed interest in Somalia, which they 
viewed as another frontline in their war on terror, when al-Shabaab declared an oath of 
allegiance to al-Qaeda. As a result, AMISOM received increased political and financial 
support, resulting in UNSC Resolution 2036, which introduced a new strategic concept for 
the mission in January of that year to increase the operation’s force size and provide it with 
                                                 
15 AUPSC 2012, Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Partnership between the African 
Union and the United Nations of Peace Security: Towards Greater Strategic and Political Coherence, 17-8. 
16 Dundon 2012, Table of Multilateral Peace Operations, 101.  
17 Ibid., 109.  
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a more robust mandate.18 The AU doubled AMISOM’s initial troop numbers from 8,000 
to nearly 17,000 that year, their costs covered by the EU APF.19 Further, EUTM Somalia 
provided additional assistance to the mission, and the UN increased its logistical support 
packages.20 
 Today, what has emerged is a sophisticated network of interorganizational 
coordination in Somalia. The remainder of this chapter will explore the conditions and 
decisions that led to this intricate web on the ground. By examining the three frameworks 
in light of the existing evidence, it seeks to determine the cause of cooperation within this 
case.  
 
Classification of Coordination 
Classifying the specific type of interorganizational coordination that has emerged 
in Somalia presents an analytical challenge, as it does not fall neatly within the sequential, 
parallel, or integrated typologies. It is also important to note that, unlike the other cases, 
only one military operation—AMISOM—has occurred on the ground, instead of multiple 
military missions by different organizations. While AMISOM was initially developed as a 
sequential peace operation, it now instead represents a potential new model of 
interinstitutional dynamics, one characterized by highly compartmentalized organizational 
roles during peacekeeping missions. Understanding this new dynamic of “functional 
                                                 
18 Van der Lijn 2013, Regional Developments in Peace Operations, 76. 
19 Dundon 2013, Global Trends in Peace Operations, 64. 
20 Van der Lijn 2013, Regional Developments in Peace Operations, 76-7. 
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categorization” is vital for understanding possible future directions of multilateral peace 
operations.21 
Peace operations in Somalia have witnessed the AU, the EU, and the UN taking on 
specialized roles, providing key strategic contributions to the missions without integrating 
operational command. Despite a confusing alphabet soup of organizational commissions, 
committees, missions, and offices operating simultaneously on the ground, the roles of the 
AU, the EU, and the UN in Somalia can be summed up quite succinctly. The AU, through 
AMISOM, is the most prominent organization on the ground, contributing the majority of 
troops and responsible for the bulk of military operations in Somalia. In essence, the 
presence of the EU and the UN in the war-torn state is primarily to support the AU’s 
mission financially, politically, and logistically. The EU utilizes the African Peace Facility 
to finance many of the personnel and non-lethal equipment costs of AMISOM, and its 
training mission, EUTM Somalia, assists in capacity-building. The UN is also responsible 
for a number of services to AMISOM. Through UNSOA, the UN provides logistics 
capacity support packages, which it finances with its own budget. And, in addition to its 
trust fund for AMISOM, the UN also provides political and strategic assistance to the 
operation through the UN Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS) and the UN Assistance 
Mission in Somalia (UNSOM).22 
For the purposes of this project, interorganizational coordination in Somalia can be 
considered as an alternative version of the integrated model. In this case, however, the 
                                                 
21 Tardy 2014, 98. 
22 Ibid., 97. 
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hybridity is not the result of an integrated operational command and control structure, but 
rather of a clear division of labor based on specialized military, political, logistical, and 
financial roles.  
 
Materialist Explanations and Evidence 
 Material factors have been a point of cooperation between the AU, the EU, and the 
UN in Somalia, yet do not provide a full causal account for the cooperative relationship 
that has emerged. It is important to establish an understanding of the interorganizational 
resource dynamics at play in Somalia between the three organizations. To begin, 
AMISOM’s operation is almost completely dependent upon external donors, both from 
independent states and multilateral organizations. Of these donors, the EU has been the 
largest single supporter of AMISOM since its deployment in 2007. The EU was initially 
hesitant to provide support to the mission because of a controversial US-backed Ethiopian 
invasion of Somalia in 2006 and the lack of interest by African countries in the mission; in 
essence, many EU member states, who were dealing with economic and political issues of 
their own, were not inclined to become embroiled in the chaos in Somalia. Yet, due to the 
rise of al-Shabaab and encouragement by the US, the EU Council saw it in their interest to 
extend support to assist in setting up AMISOM. 23 To date, it has provided nearly $650 
million to the operation through the African Peace Facility (APF),24 which was established 
to provide assistance for capacity building, peace support operations, and the development 
                                                 
23 Franke 2013. 
24 Africa-EU Partnership 2015, Support to the Creation of a Secure Environment Needed to Back the 
Political Peace Process in Somalia. 
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of early response mechanisms within the framework of the EU-Africa Partnership.25 While 
funds through the APF cannot be used for lethal equipment, they have covered the 
allowances for all AMISOM troops, costs of the police component, staff salaries, and 
operational costs of the mission’s offices.26  
Further, the UN has created a funding architecture built on two financing systems: 
“an assured financial system, which is the assessed budget of the UN, and an unpredictable, 
voluntary financial system” in the form of a trust fund.27 Both systems allow the UN 
influence of AMISOM’s funding, with the former mechanism allowing direct control and 
the latter providing indirect oversight. These measures assuaged the fears of both UN 
officials and donor states, who were hesitant to contribute to the AU, whose transparency 
and reliability is often questioned. While the UN provides far less financial support than 
the EU, its funds are still vital for key operational assets such as military equipment and 
medical support. 28  Thus, both organizations’ contributions keep AMISOM afloat 
operationally. 
 On the other hand, both the EU and the UN are dependent upon the AU and its 
member states for military personnel. Under normal conditions, it is an incredibly laborious 
and unreliable process for these organizations to appeal to their members for troop 
contributions, and given the increased volatility on the ground in Somalia due to the 
operation of extremist militant groups, states are even more reluctant to send their soldiers 
                                                 
25 Africa-EU Partnership 2015, The African Peace Facility. 
26 Africa-EU Partnership 2015, Support to the Creation of a Secure Environment Needed to Back the 
Political Peace Process in Somalia. 
27 Gadin 2012, 77. 
28 Ibid., 79. 
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to participate. While the EU and UN could hypothetically mount an operation on their own, 
doing so would require a massive mobilization of political will. However, the AU has been 
able to deploy thousands of troops in the country through AMISOM, many of them coming 
from East African states that have strong interests in regional security. 29  It is these 
peacekeepers that carry out the large majority of military operations on the ground. 
 A relationship of mutual resource dependence has emerged in Somalia, with the 
EU and the UN contributing finances and materiel, and the AU providing military 
personnel. In contrast to other cases of mutual dependence, however, resources have not 
led to significant competition, primarily because resource contributions have been 
decoupled from operational command and control on the ground. In other words, while the 
EU and the UN provide important and vital components to AMISOM, they do so with the 
recognition that it is still an AU military operation under AU control. And, “while the EU 
covers the allowances of AMISOM troops through its Africa Peace Facility, the political 
oversight that it exerts on the AU mission remains limited compared with its financial 
commitment.”30 Thus, the AU has retained operational autonomy while enjoying external 
material support, even if it still hesitant to speak out against its donors.31 
 Ultimately, when disaggregated from operational considerations, material factors 
have contributed to interorganizational cooperation in Somalia. Clear divisions of 
contributions and command have facilitated coordination between the AU, the EU, and the 
UN on the ground. That being said, materialist explanations somewhat struggle to explain 
                                                 
29 Ibid., 76-7.  
30 Tardy 2014, 112.  
31 Rotich 2015, Interview.  
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why organizations such as the UN and the EU would willingly provide financial assets 
without competing for proportional operational control. In essence, then, material factors 
may have facilitated interorganizational cooperation up to this point, or at least have not 
been a point of contention, but they do not serve as a causal account of cooperation. 
 
Organizational Dependency Explanations and Evidence 
 In addition to material factors, considerations of organizational capacity have also 
played a role in facilitating cooperation between the AU, the EU, and the UN in Somalia. 
Effective operations in the country are built upon a cohesive arrangement of each of these 
organization’s respective niche capabilities. For instance, the AU and AMISOM depend 
on a number of political, civilian, and logistical components from the EU and the UN in 
order to carry out military operations on the ground. Because AU member states struggle 
to supply the organization with specialized personnel to take on logistical tasks of 
AMISOM, the UN has provided the AU with logistical capacity support through 
UNSOA.32 For similar reasons, UNPOS is mandated to provide political guidance and 
facilitate the peace process in the country,33 serving as a mediator that is perceived by locals 
as less biased and more credible than the AU, which is made up of states with conflicting 
regional interests. 34  Lastly, UNSOM—established under UNSC Resolution 2102—
provides strategy and governance support to the AU and AMISOM, in addition to 
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34 Rotich 2015, Interview. 
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coordinating international donor structures.35 The EU has also contributed to efforts on the 
ground using specialized capacities. Besides assisting in financing AMISOM through the 
African Peace Facility, it has provided support through EUTM Somalia, which is mandated 
to strengthen both Somali civilian and security institutions.36 Together, these mechanisms 
assist in maintaining AMISOM’s strategic coherence on the ground and provide the 
mission with further multilateral legitimacy. 
 While highly dependent upon the EU and the UN for specialized assistance, the AU 
brings its own respective niche functions to peace operations in Somalia. It not only 
provides the bulk of the troops through AMISOM, but also a willingness to take on 
hazardous operations on the ground. One Kenyan diplomat noted that, although AU 
member states still often depend on the UNSC for peace and security assistance, they will 
take action when none is taken by other organizations, as has been the case in Somalia 
because of the conflict’s spillover effects on member states. 37  For instance, terrorist 
fighters from Somalia have mounted a multitude of attacks on civilians and soldiers in 
Kenya over the past few years. Concerns over volatility and terrorism have prevented the 
EU and the UN from deploying troops to the troubled state, but the AU has displayed a 
willingness to shoulder the burden of operations with AMISOM. Operations in Somalia 
have escalated from peacekeeping to peace enforcement, and the AU is the only 
organization of the three with the constitutive mandate and authority to undertake such 
missions.38 Further, the AU provides operations in Somalia with regional knowledge and 
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36 Dundon 2012, Table of Multilateral Peace Operations, 109.  
37 Rotich 2015, Interview.  
38 AU 2000, Constitutive Act of the African Union, 4(h). 
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credibility. 39  This combination of willingness and credibility is a strong comparative 
advantage for the AU among organizations that frequently struggle to mobilize their 
member states for peace operations.  
 The respective contributions of the AU, the EU, and the UN have led to a structure 
of interdependence between the three organizations. Further, the EU’s and the UN’s 
unwillingness and inability to take on military operations and the AU’s incapacity to 
establish logistical and civilian components have reinforced this dynamic. Unlike similar 
cases of dependence such as Sudan and Mali, however, operations in Somalia have 
witnessed a clear vision of labor and control over various components, leading to 
strategic—albeit not operational—cooperation rather than competition. In essence, the 
organizations have integrated capabilities without integrating control, with the AU 
retaining autonomy over its military operation, the UN over its logistical and political tasks, 
and the EU over its training mission. Thus, dependency theories—which predict that 
organizations will cooperate when dependent upon each other’s niche capabilities but 
prefer to work independently—contribute to understanding interorganizational cooperation 
in the case of Somalia. That being said, like materialist explanations, organizational 
dependency arguments for cooperation in Somalia are facilitative rather than causal, failing 
to provide a determinative account of why organizations actually chose to combine their 
capabilities in the first place. 
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Organizational Identity Explanations and Evidence 
 In addition to arguments of dependency and resources, explanations of 
organizational identity can help illuminate cooperation between the AU, the EU, and the 
UN. An understanding of these roles and identities provides further insight as to why the 
organizations have chosen to pursue a strategy of compartmentalized cooperation on the 
ground in Somalia.  
 Since the deployment of AMISOM, the situation in Somalia has witnessed the AU 
taking on a strong leadership role in the maintenance of African peace and security, a long 
desired goal of the organization. Underlying this role is the organization’s Constitutive Act, 
which provides it with a robust mandate to “intervene in a Member State pursuant to a 
decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances.”40 Somalia—a failed state with 
extremist groups and warlords vying for power—has presented far more complex and 
hostile challenges than typical peacekeeping cases, with few actors, either state or 
organizational, willing to take on a peace enforcement role.41 As a result, the AU has 
emerged as a unique player in Somalia, and unlike the cases of Sudan and Mali, other actors 
have come to recognize the AU’s role. A review of African peace operations by AU, EU, 
and UN officials found that, “Especially in…Somalia, the AU has been requested by the 
international community to take on the peace operations role because it was the only 
organisation with the political credibility and the peace operations capability to do so. And 
in these cases, the international community was willing to provide financial and material 
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support to enable the AU to undertake these operations on its behalf.”42 Thus, in Somalia, 
unlike other cases where the AU maintained an identity of leadership that was not validated 
by other organizations, its role is recognized and supported by both the EU and the UN. It 
is this intersubjective recognition, as opposed to mere self-conception, of the AU 
organization’s role that has underlain compartmentalized cooperation between the young 
institution, the EU, and the UN.  
 Further, while the UN still maintains its overarching identity of leadership, this 
identity has manifested more cooperatively in peace operations in Somalia. In the cases of 
Sudan and Mali, where the UN failed to establish independent military operations without 
AU personnel and assets, it still sought to retain operational control over the missions, 
citing its “primary responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security”43 and the 
subsidiary relationship of regional organizations described in Chapter VIII of the UN 
Charter. Instead, in an effort to avoid a messy transition such as the one from AMIS to 
UNAMID, the UN “opted for logistical, political, and technical support for AMISOM, 
which marked the limits of what the UN and its member states were ready to do in 
Somalia.”44 Therefore, rather than attempting to take over command and control functions 
from the AU, UN officials chose to recognize the contributions of AMISOM45 and to adopt 
a supportive role instead of seeking joint leadership of operations.46 Granting the AU 
operational control was a divergence from the UN’s typically predominant role, yet the 
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44 Tardy 2014, 105.  
45 UNSC 2009, Resolution 1863.  
46 De Coning 2016, Interview. 
137 
CHAPTER VI: THE CASE OF THE MISSING TIRES 
decision to take on leadership in the form of overarching logistical and political support 
and the UN’s willingness to cede command to the AU facilitated far more effective 
cooperation between the organizations, which did not run into the same type of disputes 
witnessed in Sudan over materiel and troops.  
 Lastly, in Somalia, the EU has positioned itself in a role that closely resembles its 
involvement in other African peace operations. Because of economic and political 
struggles within its own member states, along with the volatility on the ground, the EU is 
reluctant to adopt more than a limited supportive role in Somalia. In essence, the EU has 
constructed itself as a supportive partner willing to provide financial, training, and civilian 
assistance, but unwilling to take on integrated military operations. 47  This identity has 
created clear expectations on the part of the AU regarding what the EU is willing and able 
to provide, allowing AU officials to plan complementary strategies around these 
contributions. 48  Driven by counterterrorism concerns, the EU views AMISOM as a 
relatively low-cost and easy investment in the fight against extremist groups such as al-
Shabaab without having to conduct its own military mission.49 Through this lens, EU 
officials are more than willing to concede leadership of the peace enforcement mission to 
the AU in Somalia in exchange for minimal operational commitment to the mission. That 
being said, contributions through the African Peace Facility still promote the EU as a 
positive and supportive international actor within the area of peace and security and even 
allows the organization slight political oversight over AMISOM.50 
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 In brief, complementary organizational roles have resulted in effective 
compartmentalized cooperation in Somalia. Instead of disputes and questions over identity, 
ownership, and control, the three organizations hold clear understandings and expectations 
of each other’s roles on the ground. With this recognition, a division of both labor and 
resources has emerged in which the AU undertakes the peace enforcement role and retains 
operational autonomy over AMISOM, the UN provides overarching political and logistical 
leadership, and the EU serves as a supportive financial and civilian partner. Thus, 
constructed organizational identities and roles are an underlying factor that dictate how 
organizations choose to cooperate. 
 
Conclusion 
 While the situation on the ground remains highly volatile and dangerous, the case 
of Somalia actually represents an example of successful and interorganizational 
cooperation. In contrast to the cases of Sudan and Mali, Somalia has witnessed a complex 
web of compartmentalized coordination between the AU, the EU, and the UN. 
 As in other cases explored in this project, materialist and dependency arguments 
can provide us with partial understandings of interorganizational cooperation. It is clear 
from the sections above that structures of dependency—related to both resources and 
capacities—exist between the three organizations in Somalia. Within these structures, the 
AU provides the bulk of the troops necessary for military operations, the UN provides 
political, logistical, and monetary support, and the EU provides large amounts of funding 
in addition to its civilian training mission. While the anecdote of the tires illustrates that 
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cooperation got off to a slow start in Somalia, a system of contributive coordination has 
emerged, with each organization drawing upon its respective comparative advantages in 
support of a common goal—stability in the failed state and the elimination of extremist 
groups. Yet, these explanations of dependency lead to a puzzling phenomenon: the 
frameworks predict that shared resources and capabilities should lead to disputes over 
command, control, and distribution. Further, these arguments do not explain why the AU, 
the EU, and the UN decided to act cooperatively toward these resources and capabilities 
instead of competitively, as has been seen in previous cases. Thus, materialist and 
dependency explanations fall short in explaining interorganizational dynamics in this case. 
If the same dependency structures exist in Somalia as they did in Sudan and Mali, 
then why did the Somalia case result in cooperation instead of competition? This is where 
explanations of organizational identities and roles come into play. In the cases of Sudan 
and Mali, organizational identities came into direct conflict, with the AU and the UN 
debating leadership roles on the ground. Both organization made claims as to why they 
should take control of peace operations, with the UN maintaining its responsibility to 
uphold international peace and security and the AU insisting upon a strong security role on 
the African continent. In Somalia, however, shared understandings of complementary roles 
allowed the three organizations to act upon their comparative advantages cooperatively. In 
this way, the UN and the EU both recognized AU’s aspirations to become a prominent 
security actor willing to take on peace enforcement roles in Africa. At the same time, the 
UN reinterpreted its identity as the primary maintainer of international peace and security 
by providing comprehensive political and logistical support instead of insisting upon full 
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control of the AU mission. As for the EU, the organization simply reinforced its role as a 
peripheral supportive partner. Taken together, these identities allowed the three 
organizations to cooperate effectively in Somalia. 
The case of Somalia is important because it not only serves as a positive example 
of interorganizational cooperation, but also as a potential model for future operations. In 
essence, this case demonstrates the palpable results of organizational identities and the 
complementary role that they can play within multilateral peace operations. Theoretically, 
it further reinforces the notion that arguments of organizational identity may actually serve 
as more fundamental explanations as to why organizations choose to act toward resources 
and capacities cooperatively or competitively. Regardless, these explanations broaden 
understanding of interorganizational dynamics within the peacekeeping regime complex. 
The next chapter will include generalizable conclusions and policy recommendations.
CHAPTER VII 
Conclusions and Implications 
  
 
n April 2015, just over a decade after the outbreak of civil war and the deployment of 
two simultaneous peace operations in the country, Burundi was again on the brink of 
chaos. Incumbent President Pierre Nkurunziza announced that he would run for a third 
term in the 2015 election, sparking massive protests across the country. When the 
constitutional courts ruled in favor of Nkurunziza’s decision, officers from the Burundian 
armed forces, led by General Godegroid Niyombare, launched a coup. It failed. 
Nkurunziza’s government cracked down on the opposition, leaving hundreds dead and 
leading hundreds of thousands more to flee abroad. In November 2015, the UN warned 
that it was less equipped to deal with violence in Burundi than it was for the 1994 Rwandan 
genocide.1 Unlike in 1994, however, another organization was prepared to step up. The 
AUPSC declared that Africa would “not allow another genocide to take place on its soil,” 
and proposed a 5,000-strong force, the African Prevention and Protection Mission in 
Burundi.2 
 While the government in Bujumbura rejected the AU’s proposal, thereby 
dismissing the mission, the crisis in Burundi—along with ongoing violence in countries 
such as Libya, South Sudan, and Syria—highlights the urgent need for peace operations. 
                                                 
1 BBC 2016.  
2 McCormick 2015.  
I 
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More specifically, it also illuminates the increased role of regional organizations within the 
contemporary peace and security arena. 
 
Main Findings and Arguments 
Through the lens of the three analytical frameworks, this thesis has analyzed four 
in-depth case studies—the DRC, Sudan, Mali, and Somalia—in order to draw out 
generalizable conclusions regarding interorganizational cooperation and competition 
during international peace operations. In brief, it has found that the identities of 
organizations—including their understandings of their roles, purposes, and relationships—
play an important part in determining interorganizational dynamics. Of the cases analyzed, 
the study found that institutional cooperation occurred most often when organizations 
played complementary roles on the ground based on their respective identities and allowed 
each other to fulfill these roles with relative operational autonomy. Conversely, it 
discovered that organizations competed when they infringed on each other’s roles in an 
attempt to take control of resources or capacities. While structures of dependency based on 
both resources and institutional capabilities existed in each case, these factors did not 
directly dictate whether cooperation, noncooperation, or competition occurred; rather, it 
was conceptions of identity that determined how and why organizations decided to act 
toward these factors, as well as with one another.  
 The case of the DRC demonstrated the emergence of an interorganizational 
relationship between the EU and the UN, detailing how the EU’s desire to become a 
prominent and supportive organizational security actor and the UN’s self-conception as the 
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overarching maintainer of international peace and security resulted in a strategic, albeit not 
operational, partnership. These complementary roles allowed the EU to cooperatively 
provide military support to the UN in the form of the autonomous Operation Artemis, 
thereby bolstering MONUC without competing for control of its resources or the mission 
as a whole. It also illustrated how interorganizational relationships developed based on past 
experiences, which in this case was the Bosnian War.  
 In contrast, the case of Sudan displayed the competitive challenges faced by the 
AU and the UN in the establishment and execution of UNAMID. This case reinforced the 
point that hybridization does not necessarily entail cooperation between organizations. 
While the AU depended on the UN for financial, material, logistical, and political support, 
and the UN relied on the AU for personnel and legitimacy, the two organizations ultimately 
engaged in competition over command and control of the mission. This competition 
stemmed from the organizations’ conflicting roles, with the UN attempting to assert its 
control based on its role as the primary maintainer of international peace and security, and 
the AU claiming its leadership on the basis of its regional authority and legitimacy. These 
opposing identities of leadership manifested in the form of intense disputes over 
operational decision-making. 
 The case of Mali has reinforced and emphasized the conclusions drawn from the 
cases of the DRC and Sudan. Within this case, two scenarios emerged, involving the AU 
and the UN in the first and the EU and the UN in the second. The situation of the AU and 
the UN resembles that of the two organizations in Sudan: both organizations were 
dependent on each other for resources, troops, and niche capabilities, but ultimately clashed 
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over leadership and direction of the mission. AU officials felt as if their efforts in Mali had 
been dismissed and diminished by the UN, while the latter maintained that its status as the 
principal security organization allowed it control over operations. Meanwhile, the dynamic 
between the EU and the UN has been similar to their relationship in the DRC. The EU 
(including France’s Operation Serval and EUTM Mali) maintained its role as a supportive 
and autonomous security organization, providing specialized support as opposed to vying 
for overall control of the mission. EU officials were willing to cede such control to the UN 
in an effort to avoid becoming bogged down on the ground. In essence, cooperation 
occurred when the two organizations recognized each other’s complementary roles and 
allowed each other operational autonomy.  
 Lastly, the case of Somalia demonstrated the rationale and benefits of a cooperative 
framework established on organizational roles and identities. Such cooperation emerged 
out of a clear division of labor based on shared understandings of what each organization 
was able, willing, and expected to do. Further, the coupling of these roles with operational 
autonomy has allowed the organizations to complete tasks without competitive overlap. 
With the AU undertaking the bulk of military operations, the UN providing resources and 
political capacities, the EU contributing financial and civilian assistance, and NATO 
adding logistical and technical support, all four organizations have drawn upon their 
comparative advantages in support of a larger goal. And, while AMISOM still faces 
enormous challenges in the war-ravaged country of Somalia, the resulting model that has 
been developed—albeit rather spontaneously, rather than deliberately—has the potential 
to be applied to future peace operations.  
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Theoretical Implications 
More generally, this project points to several larger trends in interorganizational 
cooperation. First, it shows that two prominent lenses which have been utilized to examine 
such dynamics—materialist and dependency theories—are not sufficient in accounting for 
what actually causes cooperation or competition between organizations. In every case, 
some sort of dependency structure existed, whether based on resources or capacities, yet 
there was large variation of how organizations acted toward them. In other words, 
“organisational interaction is not simply a functional and automatic reaction to external 
incentive structures.”3 Mali and Somalia, for instance—two cases in which the AU and the 
UN were reliant on each other to fulfill similar needs of personnel, materiel, and logistical 
and political capabilities—witnessed intense competition in the former and cooperation in 
the latter. Thus, material considerations and specialized capabilities are key factors when 
analyzing interorganizational dynamics, but this research suggests that they are less 
important as determinative, causal factors, and more important as pieces of a larger puzzle. 
Solving this puzzle require understandings of organizational identities, which explain how 
organizations prioritize and utilize these factors.  
 Second, this thesis highlights the importance of organizational autonomy. As 
Gowan and Sherman note, “Organizations aim to maintain the highest degree of 
operational autonomy possible, even where they are cooperating extremely closely.” 4 
Brosig echoes this idea, stating, “Cooperation finds its limits in situations in which 
                                                 
3 Brosig 2011, Overlap and Interplay between International Organisations: Theories and Approaches, 156. 
4 Gowan and Sherman 2012, 2.  
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interaction substantially compromises the autonomy of an institutions. Thus there are 
circumstances in which cooperation benefits are available but IOs do not pursue them 
because they fear loss of autonomy and the concomitant marginalisation and domination 
by an external actor.”5 On a practical level, giving organizations autonomy during peace 
operations allows them to perform tasks more efficiently, and moreover, it facilitates 
recognition of their contributions to international security. This recognition, in turn, has 
tangible consequences, as maintaining relevance as a security organization means 
increased funding, responsibility, and support. In this sense, autonomy is linked with 
relevance, and relevance is linked with organizational survival.  
 Third, this thesis reinforces the notion that international and regional organizations 
should be treated as individual actors that “enjoy a degree of autonomy from their 
principals.”6 Organizations are actors with unique priorities, perceptions, and issues of 
their own; more importantly, though, their actions produce outcomes that influence 
international politics separate from actions of their components.7 In brief, the whole is 
intrinsically different than the sum its parts. This concept is important primarily due to the 
intricate and complicated nature of regime complexes. Aggarwal identifies three types of 
regime complexes: parallel regimes, which feature little to no overlap between institutions; 
overlapping regimes, in which multiple institutions have authority over an issue, but there 
is no clear hierarchy of order; and nested regimes, where institutions are embedded within 
each other.8 These three classifications of interinstitutional dynamics are already complex 
                                                 
5 Brosig 2011, Overlap and Interplay between International Organisations: Theories and Approaches, 156.  
6 Ibid., 148.  
7 Allison 1969, 699-700.  
8 See Aggarwal 1998.  
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enough before adding in the interstate dynamics of members within the organizations. 
Therefore, treating organizations as individual actors that are influenced by, but are not 
merely the product of, member states saves a substantial amount of time and effort when 
analyzing a given issue. 
 Fourth, this study can contribute to the field of regime complexity by demonstrating 
the value of compartmentalizing and categorizing interactions between organizations. Even 
when treating organizations as independent actors, the aforementioned complicated nature 
of regime complexes makes it especially difficult to trace causal processes within them. As 
Alter and Meunier note, these complications have implications for decision-making, stating, 
“Causal complexity makes it harder to identify clear cause and effect relations, 
complicating the task of identifying optimal policies and assigning accountability for 
problematic decisions.”9 As this study has found, however, it is easier to identify causal 
factors when separating strategic interactions from operational interactions between 
organizations. Thus, instead of scouring to find cause and effect relations within the 
interactions of two elaborate organizations taken as wholes, it is more efficient and 
expedient to identify these factors in the interactions of subdivisions, such as bureaucratic 
or military interactions. More generally, it means that interactions at different levels of 
organizations demonstrate unique characteristics and should be analyzed separately.  
 Fifth, conceptions of organizational identity can be applied to other problems of 
collective action that include the participation of international and regional institutions. 
Some scholars have maintained that, in addition to strategic and resource concerns, 
                                                 
9 Alter and Meunier 2009, 18.  
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conceptions of identity and reputation influence the decision-making process of states 
when it comes to issues of collective action. For instance, Busby notes how Canada and 
Japan sought to take on leadership roles regarding global climate change, especially during 
the negotiations for the Kyoto Protocol.10 These constructed roles influenced both how they 
approached negotiations and ratified the treaty. Further, they in many ways resemble the 
roles that the UN and the AU have sought to take within the peacekeeping regime complex, 
with both organizations adopting identities and roles that influenced their decision-making 
processes beyond just resources and capabilities. This connection suggests that 
organizational identity can play a key role in collective issues such as environmental 
protection or terrorism by helping to explain how and why organizations act to address 
these problems. In addition, leveraging complementary organizational roles can facilitate 
the creation of more unified and collaborative responses.  
 In the future, more research can be done to examine the emergence of 
organizational identities, as well as how these identities play a role in influencing outcomes 
within regime complexes related to other international issues. More specifically, it would 
be useful to explore the creation and development of interorganizational relationships. 
While the case of the DRC focused on the security relationship between the EU and the 
UN, more could be done to explain the politics behind how these relationships begin, 
especially considering the substantial overlap in membership between organizations. 
    
                                                 
10 See Busby 2010, 104-50.  
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Policy Implications and Recommendations 
 This project also suggests a number of policy implications, as well as 
recommendations for future peace operations. First, it is important to note that there is not 
a direct link between interorganizational cooperation and the efficiency of a given peace 
operation. This thesis has deliberately refrained from classifying cooperation as 
“successful” because a high level of cooperation does not automatically lead to the “success” 
of a mission, with success here being defined as the mission’s ability to achieve goals such 
as stabilizing the country, protecting civilians, separating conflicting parties, and assisting 
in processes of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration. Nowhere is this lack of 
empirical connection more glaring than in the case of Somalia, which has experienced 
cooperation between numerous organizations but has not yet witnessed significant progress 
in terms of achieving stability and lowering volatility.11 This point is not meant to diminish 
or invalidate the contributions and coordination of organizations, as cooperation can lead 
to the inclusion of a diverse range of resources and capabilities; rather, it is merely a 
disclaimer that interorganizational cooperation is not a panacea in and of itself for more 
efficient or effective operations. Further, it should not overshadow the other side of the 
story, which is that interorganizational competition can lead to missions that are less 
effective at providing security, although this claim is also not necessarily causal. Alex 
Bellamy notes the case of Sudan, where the hybrid model of UNAMID has been less 
                                                 
11 De Coning 2016, Interview. 
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effective than a typical UN peacekeeping mission, despite utilizing capabilities and 
resources from multiple organizations.12 
 Second, there is a large divergence between bureaucratic and operational decision-
making within organizations regarding cooperation with other institutions. At the 
secretariat levels, there is a spirit of cooperation, exemplified by liaisons and joint 
statements. Yet, such agreements, treaties, and memorandums of understanding between 
organizations regarding coordination lack credibility and substance if they do not manifest 
in the form of actual cooperation on the ground. On the strategic and operational levels, 
this spirit is not matched, with the vast majority missions featuring multiple organizational 
actors being either sequential or parallel.13 This discrepancy between the bureaucratic and 
the operational levels of coordination are concerning because the former can give the false 
impression of cooperative activism without resulting in positive change on the ground. 
Therefore, more must be done by organizations to translate this proclaimed cooperative 
spirit into operational mechanisms, particularly ones that address points of competition. In 
practice, these mechanisms could include joint standardized procedures of command and 
control, a clearer operational chain of command, and an agreed upon leadership selection 
process. Even if organizations ultimately choose to act autonomously and forgo pursuing 
the intricate coordination of hybrid or integrated missions, such measures can still reduce 
competition and enhance strategic cooperation. 
                                                 
12 Bellamy 2015, Interview.  
13 Brosig 2015, Interview.  
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 Third, this thesis can contribute to a more comprehensive and functional 
international security system. In a 2005 conference, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan 
called for the UN and its member states to support the establishment of an “interlocking 
system of peacekeeping capacities” which would rely on the capabilities and resources of 
regional organizations.14 Some academics have agreed with Annan, seeing potential in “the 
development of a truly interlocking system of security governance in which actors engage 
in a systematically designed coordination of peacekeeping capabilities.”15 In theory, this 
system should be attractive because it reduces burdens of resources and management by 
relying on each organization’s respective comparative advantages. Yet, as others have 
noted, the reality has been far different, with the AU, the EU, NATO, and the UN 
independently pursuing “the entire spectrum of crisis management activities” instead of 
establishing a cooperative system.16 Thus, despite the fact that collaboration of resources 
and capacities would result in absolute gains for all organizations involved, the interlocking 
security system has yet to be achieved over a decade after Annan’s first announcement. 
Here, organizational identities can provide useful insight into realizing this goal.  
 As was the case in this thesis, materialist and dependency arguments do not fully 
account for why organization choose to compete (in this case, pursuing independent 
security strategies instead of an interlocking system) when they are reliant upon each 
other’s resources and capacities. However, where the concept of an interlocking security 
system struggles is precisely in the area of organizational identity. To begin, in essence, 
                                                 
14 UN 2005.  
15 Brosig 2014, 75.  
16 Tardy 2010, Building Partnerships in Peace Operations: The Limits of the Global/Regional Approach, 1.  
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such a system requires participating organizations to amalgamate not only materiel, 
personnel, and capabilities, but also their identities, forming yet another security 
institution—one that is interorganizational, not interstate—that transcends any single 
member. Less abstractly, this means that accomplishments of this system will be collective 
in nature, as opposed to being attributed to a given organization. And, because 
organizations are heavily reliant upon relevance and the recognition of accomplishments 
in order to garner support from their member states, these issues of attribution have serious 
tangible effects.  
Further, the prospect of an interlocking security system raises questions over 
leadership. Despite being a collective entity, such a system would nevertheless require 
incredible amounts of coordination and a clear hierarchy of organization. While the natural 
inclination would be for the UN to manage overarching coordination of this complex, this 
project has demonstrated that conflicting conceptions of identity result in competing 
demands for command and control. Moreover, as was seen in the hybrid case of UNAMID, 
integration does not guarantee cooperation; on the contrary, it can complicate these matters 
of control even more.  
 With these considerations in mind—coupled with the importance of autonomy—
several policy recommendations emerge regarding the creation of an interlocking security 
system. First and foremost, the development of such a system must not only consider 
resources and capacities, but also organizational roles and identities. Working with these 
roles as opposed to against them will help create stronger and more predictable 
relationships within the peacekeeping regime complex. For instance, in the cases of this 
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thesis, the AU has shown itself to be not only a dependable source of troops, but also an 
actor willing to take on more volatile peace enforcement operations with regional 
legitimacy. These last two factors stem from its self-conception as a security leader on the 
African continent, a useful role which should be considered within an interlocking security 
system.  
Meanwhile, while the EU has shown itself as an important contributor to peace 
operations, many have questioned whether the level of such contributions reflect the higher 
financial and military levels of the organization.17 Yet, attempting to persuade the EU to 
adopt a more prominent role within the interlocking system will most likely be met with 
resistance by the organization, whose member states seek to “avoid the well-known flaws 
of UN operations such as mission creep, taking on high risk operations in seemingly 
hopeless conflicts, deploying never ending missions and suffering from overly ambitious 
mandates.”18 Instead, an interlocking system should work with the EU’s constructed role 
as a “non-dominant, but facilitating” actor operating “within clearly defined activity 
fields.”19 In brief, trying to make the EU play a role that it neither has “the political will 
nor a globally accepted mandate” to do will undoubtedly result in failure.20 
 Lastly, the UN itself must be willing to give more control to regional organizations 
in order to more effectively leverage their respective advantages toward a shared goal of 
promoting international peace and security. As the cases examined have demonstrated, 
autonomy is important, and operations where the UN has attempted to control operations 
                                                 
17 See Vines 2010.  
18 Brosig 2014, 75. 
19 Ibid., 74-5. 
20 Ibid., 78-9. 
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to the point that it has infringed substantially on the autonomy and leadership of other 
organizations—such as Sudan and Mali—have witnessed competition, not cooperation. In 
cases where the UN has allowed for increased autonomy, such as with the EU’s Operation 
Artemis in the DRC, it has received crucial beneficial support. This pattern suggests that 
contributions from regional organizations are most substantial and best utilized when the 
UN respects the role of these organizations as autonomous and independent operational 
actors. As a result, it may be wise for the UN to reinterpret Chapter VIII of its charter so 
that its relationships with regional organizations are not vertical dynamics of dominance 
and subservience, but rather of a more horizontal nature, granting higher levels of 
autonomy that more accurately correspond with the increasing capacities of these 
organizations.  
 
Conclusion 
 While this thesis has focused on the theoretical and abstract concepts of regime 
complexity and international peace operations, it is ultimately imperative to keep in mind 
the true importance of this project. Behind every mission and organizational decision, the 
lives of innocent humans are on the line. Peacekeeping may have initially been developed 
to separate warring factions following political settlements, but more importantly, peace 
operations exist “to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war.”21 The founding 
documents of the AU, the EU, NATO, and UN all explicitly affirm their respective 
                                                 
21 UN 1945, UN Charter.  
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commitments to the promotion and preservation of peace. With ongoing crises in Africa 
and the Middle East, as well as potential hotspots in other parts of the globe, the 
international community must address how it will respond to the increasing complexity 
and intricacy of contemporary conflict. It is clear that no single organization can take on 
this task alone. This project hopes to contribute to this process by explaining how 
organizations can best leverage their resources, capabilities, and identities in order to 
collaboratively and effectively find solutions to these problems. And, in the end, an 
effective solution means promoting the shared goal of each and every organization—
protecting innocent civilians.
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